Startup: Lecture 8 - How to Get Started, Doing Things that Don't Scale, Press
从校园创业到规模化:DoorDash创始人的起步与成长之路
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- 2025-06-07 15:51
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- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oQOC-qy-GDY
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speaker 1: Yeah thanks for having me, Sam. I' M Stanley. I'm the founder of DoorDash. It's really amazing to be here because it wasn't naturally that long ago where I sat in your seats. I was class of 2014, graduated in cs, as well as my co founder, Andy. And for those of you who don't know what door dshe is, we're building an on demand delivery network for local cities. And I want to start off with this photo that I took just a few months ago. And I think this was the night when we just raised our series a. And I took this photo as I was walking back to where I lived, actually lived in roeley at the time on campus. And I took this photo because I realized this, how ridiculous the combinations of things that was holding in my hand at the time. And I was holding my cs 247 homework, and then I had my tax forms since it was April, and I had to fill out taxes. And then also that yellow speeding ticket. And then right below that was a $15 million piece of paper I just signed from sequoia. And that kind of summarizes just how ridiculous our journey has been, you know, starting at Stanford, doing this while I was at Stanford, and then transitioning this into an actual startup. And I want na share that story with you today. It all began two years ago, actually, in a Macron store. It was my junior year at Stanford. This was fall quarter. And at the time, I was really passionate about how do you build technology for small business owners. And I sat down with Chloe, the owner of Chantal guon, a maccoon store in palalto at the time, just interviewing her, trying to get feedback on this, on this product prototype we've been working on, and also just learning about what her problems were in general. And it was during this meeting when Chloe first brought up this problem of delivery, you know, I remember she took out this really, really thick booklet, and she showed me pages and pages of delivery orders. And a lot of these orders she had to turn down because there's no way she could have fulfold them. You know, she had no drivers. And she was the one who ended up having to personally deliver all these orders. And that was a very interesting moment for us. And then we over the over the course of the next few weeks, we talked to around another 150, 200 small business owners. And when we brought this idea of delivery, they kept agreeing with us, saying, Yeah, this is a really big problem for us. We don't have delivery infrastructure. It's such a huge pain for us. There's not any good solutions out there which led us wonder now, delivery is such a common thing, isn't such an obvious thing. Why hasn't anyone solved this before, right? Like we must be missing something here. So we thought, maybe because people have tried this in the past, right? But they failed because there wasn't consumer demand for this. So we thought, okay, how can we test this hypothesis? You know, we were just a bunch of college kids at the time, you know we didn't own trucks or delivery infrastructures or anything like that, right? We can't just spin up a delivery company overnight. So how can we test this assumption we had? So we decided to create a simple experiment with restaurant delivery. We spent about an afternoon just putting together a really quick landing page, and now went on the Internet. I found some pdf menus of restaurants in Palo Alto, stuck it up there, and then had a phone number at the bottom, and which was our personal cell phone number, actually, and that was it. We put up the landing page, we called it paaltodelivery. Com. And this is actually what it looked like, you know, super, super, you know, simple, ugly. Like honestly, we weren't really expecting anything. We just launched it. And all we wanted to see was, you know, would we get phone calls from this? And if we got enough phone calls, then maybe this was this delivery idea was something we're pursuing. So we put it up there. We weren't really expecting anything. And we were driving back home and all of a sudden we got a phone call, you know, someone called, they wanted to order Thai food. And we were like, Oh, wow, this is a real order. Like, you know, we could have to do something about it, right? So we're in our cars and we're like, okay, we're not doing anything right now. Miles will just, let's just stream by, you know, siam royal, pick up some patat Thai and let's deliver it to this person and let's try to learn how this whole delivery thing works. And we did. We deliver it to this guy up in alpine road. I remember he told us he was I was asking me, Oh, how did he hear about us? Know what he do, he told us was he was a scholar and then he handed me his business card and instead he was the author of a book called weed the people. And that was like our first ever delivery, right? It was like the best first delivery slash worst delivery you could have asked for. We couldn't make this stuff up. And Yeah and then the next day we got you know two more phone calls. The after that we got five and then it became seven and then became ten. And then soon we started gaining traction on campus with paaltodelivery dot com, which was pretty crazy because think about it, right? This was a landing page. You had to look up pdf menus to place your order, and they had to call in. This isn't exactly the most professional looking site yet. People still, we kept getting phone calls. We kept getting orders. And that's kind of when we knew we were onto something, when people were willing we knew we found a need people wanted, when people were willing to put up with all this. So I think another key point to remember is that we launched this in about an hour, right? Like we didn't spend know we have any drivers, we didn't have any algorithms, spend you, we didn't have a back end. We didn't spend six months building like a fancy dispatch system. And we don't have any of that. We just launched because at the beginning, none of that is necessary, right? At the beginning. It's all about testing your idea, trying to get this thing off the ground, figuring out whether this was something people even wanted. And it's okay to hack things together at the beginning at yc, to the mantra we like to talk about is doing things that don't scale. So at the beginning, we were the delivery drivers. We would go to class and then after class would go deliver food. We were the custom support. I sometimes had to take phone calls during lecture, had to we spent afternoons just going down University Avenue passing out flyers about trying to promote DoorDash. I mean, we didn't have any dispatch systems. So what we had to do was, you know, we used square to charge all of our customers. We used Google Docs to keep track of our orders. We used apples, find my friends to keep track of where all of our drivers were, stuff like that, figuring out like just hacking together solutions. You're trying to get this thing off the ground. In fact, at one point, we were growing so fast that square actually shut our countdown because we were under suspicions for money. Launderry we think about it, we were getting small chunks of like $15, 20 orders coming in at a rapid pace. It was Yeah and luckily my cofounder Tony worked at square, so he just emailed some buddies there and everything was solved. Yeah and another thing about doing things that don't scale is that it also allows you to become an expert in your business, right? Like driving helped us understand how the whole delivery process worked. You know we use that as an opportunity to talk to our customers, talk to our restaurants. We did dispatching, which helped us figure out you how we manually dispatch every driver and that helped us figure out what our driver assignment algorithm should look like. We did customer support ourselves, know getting real time feedback from our customers. I remember you know for the first few months when we got started, we would manually email every single one of our new customers. And at the end of every night and just asking them, Oh, how was your first delivery? How did you hear about us? And we would personalize all these emails, right? Like if I see someone ordered chicken skewers from orange hummus, I would say, Oh, like I love orange hummus. How we're chicken skewers. How did your first delivery went? You just feedback like that was really valuable and our customers really, really appreciated that. And I remember one time this was during yc at we just came out of meeting with one of our restaurant partners and we heard about this ice cream store that just opened up on University Avenue called cream. And we wanted to go try it out. And then all of a sudden, our co founder back at our office slash house texted us saying, Oh, we need drivers on the road. We got a huge Spike in demand. So we debated for maybe you 10s, like, should we go get ice cream or should we go go deliver? Obviously, you went and delivered, but that kind of became our motivation on you know scaling, right? Like if we can scale, then you could go get ice cream next time. So Yeah, I think that kind of and now of course, we've scaled across different cities. Now you have to worry about building out automated solutions and dispatch systems and figuring out how do you match demand and supply and all that fancy technology stuff. But none of that matters at the beginning because at the beginning, it's all about getting this thing off the ground and trying to find product market fit. So just to summarize, so the three things I would say that I learned from doing doordasshes. First, test your hypothesis. You want to treat your startup ideas like experiments. The second thing is launched fast. We launched in less than an hour with a really simple landing page. And finally, it's okay to do things that don't scale. Doing things that don't scale is one of your biggest competitive advantages when you're starting out. And you can figure out how to scale once you have the demand. And maybe once you've scaled, then you could go get that ice cream. Thanks. Sure. Customers hear about it. Yeah. So the question was, how did our first customer hear about us? Our very first one, I have no idea. We just launched polidelivery com. We didn't do any marketing. So I assume he just must have typed in polidelivery into the web browser. And then after that, we didn't do did barely any marketing. I think I sent out like one email to my dorm and douwas about it. It was all through word of mouth. And that kind of just validates you know just how strong of the need you found. You know when people just start talking about you and they're willing to put up with all this you know terrible user experience, terrible design and stuff like that. speaker 2: When you started, it seems so obvious you're wondering, why has no one done this? What's your answer? Now. speaker 1: looking back, Yeah, I mean, looking back, I think I think the biggest thing is mobile, the fact that now everyone has one of those in their pocket. And we kind of saw that trend and thought, you know what if you can design you a delivery system that was entirely based off mobile where you don't you didn't have to have any infrastructure or delivery fleets. Instead, you could you know instead of hiring drivers full time, purchasing vehicles, what if you can tap into a more of an on demand pool of independent contractors and only send orders to them when they have time? So that's kind of the insight we had. Everything was done through mobile. speaker 2: Yeah. Did you know we were going to be a starup or we just making some money? Yeah. I mean, at the time. speaker 1: we just wanted we're all really passionate about building technology for small business owners. And I know honestly, this delivery thing came out of an experiment, right, with the landing page, like it was literally an experiment. We didn't we weren't expecting anything and it just took off and we went with it. And logistics was always something we were really passionate about as well, you know, like logistics, transportation. And it's kind of the perfect fusion of how to help small business owners through delivery back Yeah do . speaker 3: you launch the mobile . speaker 1: app first or the website? And how long did it take from ito? The first launch? Yeah, we started with this landing page right here. Took us an hour to launch. Out goda set up a space built . speaker 2: with postmates and seamless and . speaker 1: other companies. Yeah, Yeah. The question was how does dodash stand out among a very competitive space? I mean, in the beginning, I mean, for us, consumer demand has never been the problem even up until now. So for us, it's just about finding a need and just focusing on serving that serving that demand. So in the beginning, competition doesn't really matter when you're getting started. speaker 2: Did into company first. Yeah . speaker 1: question was how long it took for to incorporate into a company when we went through yc. So we launched in January 2013, and then we did yc that very summer. And when we decided to take this idea through yc, we incorporated one more Yeah you what . speaker 3: do you plan to do next or where do you plan to go with this . speaker 1: besides like food delivery? Yeah. I mean, the question was, where do we plan to go beyond food delivery? I mean, for us, the when we started DoorDash, it was always, you know like I said about you know helping small business owners and figuring out you know how do you serve this for any local merchant, whether you were a macarum store or restaurant or a furniture shop? I mean, that's still our focus. That's like the long term vision. For now, we're just focused on restaurant delivery as a way to scale, but ultimately, that's where you want to end up in. Thanks. Okay, next is Walker Williams from tespring tespring with yc to I that I almost rejected them, sounds like a dumb idea, but now they're doing hundreds of Milto dollars of revenue. So very luckily, I is not. And walis going to talk also about doing things in unscale. speaker 3: All right, thank you guys for having me. My name is Walker. I'm the CEO and founder of tespring. For those of you guys who don't know what tespring is, we're an e -commerce platform that allows entrepreneurs to launch products and apparel brands without risk, cost or compromise. Today, the company is about 180 folks, and we ship tens of thousands of products each day. And I want na talk to you about one of the most fundamental advantages you have as a startup, and that's that you're able to do things that don't scale. And I define things that don't scale as things that are sort of fundamentally unsustainable. They will not last. They will not bring in the millionth user. And where they break, it's usually time, but it could be a number of other things. But it's really growth strategies that won't take you to a million users. And there's three real places I want to focus on today. The first one is finding your first users. The second one is turning those users into champions. And the third one is finding your product and market fit. So finding your first users. speaker 2: the first thing you have . speaker 3: to understand is that there is no silver bullet for user acquisition. You, everybody, and this includes me, when we got started, you look for that dream solution, that paperclick campaign that has tremendous roi, some accelerating partnership that's going to springboard you into the stratosphere, an affiliate agreement, something that solves it for you. But the reality is for the vast majority of companies, and in fact, for every company that I've had the chance to speak to the CEO of, that's just not possible. Those are unicorns. And most of the companies that from the outside look like they've had this dream growth curve, the reality is that those first users were impossibly hard to get. And let me tell you the story of a ridiculously unsustainable business. So this is tespring. In 2012, when we first launched, the business couldn't have looked worse. It took days of meetings. We had to offer free design, days of revisions back and forth, wehave to launch the product ourselves, wehave to do the social media, all the sell like 50 shirts for a local nonprofit and generate dollar thousand of revenue. Anybody looking in would have said, you guys need to give up. This is a terrible idea. But as time went on, those users start to add up. And I think something you have to understand is that when you first launch a company just by virtue of the fact that it's a new product, you're going to be bad at selling it, right? You've got no idea what the pain points of customers really are. You've never sold it before. You don't have any success stories to point to or testimonials. Those first users are always going to be the hardest. And so it's your responsibility as a founder to do whatever it takes to bring in your first users. And you know it's going to be different for every company. The common thread that I hear is founders need to spend personal time and effort, a lot of their personal time and effort to bring those users in themselves. It can mean a number of things, everything from sending 100 emails a day, getting on the phone and just calling as many people as you can, going through a network, if you have a network like Stanford or Y Combinator, anything you can do to get that first user. And you know, I really equate it to pushing a boulder up a hill. And if you think of like a very sort of smooth hill when you get started, the incline is the steepest and those first inches are the hardest. And over time, as you get farther and farther, the incline steaout, it gets easier. And hopefully eventually you reach a point where you're at the top of the hill and the boulder starts to roll on its own. And so those first users, you just cannot focus on roi in the sense of time, do not expect to spend an hour and return thousands of dollars. Maybe Stanley is one of those unicorns. That was a pretty incredible story. But for most of us, those first users are going to take a lot of hand, holding a lot of personal love, and that's okay. That's essential for building a company. And the one sort of caveat of that is that I don't recommend giving away your product for free. And there's plenty of exceptions to this rule. But in general, cutting costs or giving the product away is an unsustainable strategy. I wouldn't recommend you need to make sure that users value your product. And you know, people have a different they treat products that are free in a much different way than a paid product. And oftentimes, it can give you a false sense of security of, Oh, we're getting all these users, surely we can convert them over to paid. The second aspect is what happens when you get those users? How do you turn those users into champions? And a champion is a user who talks about and advocates for your product. And I'm a firm believer that every company with a great growth strategy has users who are champions. And so really, the easiest way to turn a user into a champion is to delight them with an experience they're going na remember. So something that's unusual or out of the ordinary, an exceptional experience. And the easiest way to do this early and again, something that is completely unsustainable, it's not going to scale forever, is to just talk to those users. And people will say this all the time, and you hear it's one of the sort of core tenets of why combinator is talk to users. But I cannot stress how important it is that you spend a large chunk of your time talking to users, and you should do it constantly, every single day and as long as possible. Today at tespring, I'm still the catch all email address. So anytime somebody misspells, support or writes an email address that doesn't exist, I get that email. And so I still do about twelve to 20 customer service tickets every single day. I spend hours each night reading every single tweet. Probably a little bit ocd, but that's okay. I read through all the tespring communities. You're never going to get a better sense for your product than actually listening to real users. And especially in the early days, you're just the product you launch with. And the feature set you launch with is almost certainly not going to be the feature set that you scale with. And the quicker you talk to users and learn what they actually need, the faster you can get to that point. So there's three ways to talk to your customers. You can run customer service yourself. Up until tespring was doing about 130, $140000a month, my co founder, Evan, and I did everything in customer service. This is one that there's going to be an instinct to quickly PaaS off, and that's because it's painful. Even today, when I open our customer service portal, I have like an emotional reaction where my stomach syks because it sucks talking to users who have had a terrible experience. And it's painful. It's something that you love and you've put so much effort into and you've gotten it wrong or they've had a terrible experience or somebody didn't treat them right. But it's so important that you go through that and learn what you need to build, what you need to fix. The second step is to proactively reach out to current and churcustomers and and churcustomers or customers who have left. And this is one that often falls by the wayside in sort of the pursuit of new customers. But you want to make sure that your customers are having a consistent good experience. You don't want to just leave those current users as sort of you don't want to take them for granted. And then when a user actually leaves your service, you want to reach out and find out why, both because that personal outreach can make the difference between leaving and staying. Sometimes people just need to know that you care and it's going to get better. And because even if you can't bring them back, there's a chance that you can learn from the mistake you made that caused them to leave and fix it so you don't churn users out the same way in the future. And the final one is, again, the one that I'm probably too ocd about, but it's social media and communities. You need to know how people are talking about your brand. You need to reach out and make sure that when somebody does have a bad experience and they're talking about it, that you make it right. Problems are inevitable in startups. There's going to be issues. You're not going to have the perfect product. Things are going to break. Things are going to go wrong. That's not important. What's important is to always make it right, to always go the extra mile and make that customer happy. One detractor who's had a terrible experience on your platform is enough to reverse the progress of ten champions. It's all it takes is one person out there to say, now you shouldn't use those guys for X, Y and z. Reason to ruin a ton of momentum. So even if there's examples in the early days where we would mess up massive orders, weprint the color slightly wrong, it would be the wrong size and it would be like half of our GMV for that month. And we would know we got it wrong. The customer would be unhappy. And sort of this instinct is, well, you know, it's only a little bit off or it's not completely wrong. Itbe, fine. But the reality is you just got to bite the bullet and make sure that it's right. And those customers, the customers that are often originally the most frustrated, tend to turn into the biggest champions and the longest term users. And the last one I want to talk about is finding product and market fit. And what I mean by that is that, know, I mentioned this earlier, but the product you launch with will almost certainly not be the product that takes you to scale. And so your job in those early moments, in those early days of a startup, is to progress and iterate as fast as possible to reach that product that does have market fit. And as engineers, your instinct is going to be to build a platform with beautiful clean code that scales right? You don't want to write sort of duct tape code that's going to pile on technical debt, but you need to optimize for speed over scalability and clean code. And sort of an example of this is in the early days, we had a couple enterprise customers come to us, sort of bigger non profits and say, Hey, we really like your service. But you're missing these fundamental things. So we're not going to use it. And we looked at sort of what it would take to build out those features, and we weren't sure they were going to work long term, but we wanted to try it. And my co founder, Evan, who is our cto and a million times better developer than I am, sort of ran the math and figured out that if we did it the right way, it was going na take about a month to build out these features. And in a startup, a month, you live in dog years, a month is a year. And that just wasn't going na do. So he actually went out, duplicated the code base, duplicated the database, and was able to basically build a completely different product that he didn't have to worry about the existing users for. To serve these enterprise customers, we gave them the tool. They onboarded. They generate a lot of revenue. Eventually, we learned what features were core, and we integrated them into the core product. But what would have taken a month, we were able to do in three to four days. A great rule of thumb is to only worry about the next order of magnitude. So when you have your tenth user, you shouldn't be wondering, well, how are we going to serve a million users? You should be worried about how are we going to get to 100. When you're at 100, you should think about a thousand. It's one of those things where necessity is the mother of invention of all inventions. So when you hit that breaking point, like the Twitter failwhale is a great example. And tespring, there were month stretches where every single night the site would crash every night and during the day, and every single person on the team would go to sleep with their phone on loud under their pillow, so that inevitably when the buzzer went off, you could quickly get up, restart the servers and go back to sleep. And this would happen daily. But the reality is that it was worth it. And you know, you'll end up with these huge pain points and all this technical debt and regret, but it's worth it just to get to that end goal. And that product fit faster, you will make it work. You will survive that. Those sort of bumps are just speed bumps. And speed is so, so important early. So the lesson that I've been learning lately is you want to do these things that don't scale as long as possible. There's not some magical moment. It's not the series a. It's not when you hit a certain revenue milestone that you stop doing things that don't scale. This is one of your biggest advantages as a company. And the moment you give it up, you're giving your competitors that are smaller, that can still do these things that advantage over you. So as long as humanly possible, as long as it is a net positive, you need to be spending time talking to your users. You need to move fast in development as fast as possible, but don't give it up willingly. It should be ripped from you. And so sort of trying to practice what I preach, I want to give you guys my email address. If you guys have any questions, if you want to learn about tespring, if you want to print some t shirts, fingers crossed, just shoot me an email. I'd love to help and I'd love to speak to you. And the last thing is we've created an official how to start a startup tea with Sam, and all proceeds are going to watsee. I couldn't miss this opportunity to sell. So if you guys want na grab one of the officialtejust, go to tespring dot com slash startup and it's supporting a great cause. Thank you. Sure. Go ahead. The t shirt printing business, it seems like it has a lot of comso. What convinced you to think this is a viable market . speaker 2: even when sht going well in. speaker 3: you know, so the question was, the t shirt printing business has a lot of competition. What would convince us to get into the market? I think there's two factors to it. So first, I completely agree. From the outside, people have been telling us that this is a silly idea since day one. And sort of at every order of magnitude we reach, people will come and say, Hey, that's a terrible, terrible idea. Why are you doing that? But the reason that we launched tespring is because we ran into a personal pain point where we had a need and we looked at the current solutions. I was a student at Brown, and I was trying to create a remember the bar shirt for a dive bar that got shut down. And I realized that nothing needed, nothing matched my needs. And so because I knew that I had that pain point, and I knew there was market fit, and I had seen people adopt the product, I knew there was something there. And it was also one of those things where you can you can sort of feel the wind on your back where people are adopting the product quickly. The pain point is clearly there. It's not a met need. So I would say that oftentimes great ideas start by looking like silly ideas, and then you can sort of feel out whether or not there's a scalable business here by how people are adopting it. Is it possible to bring customers aboard? Sure. speaker 1: Our nonprofits, your biggest customer base? No. speaker 3: You know today, our biggest customer base, our entrepreneurs who are trying to build brands and businesses, you know we have a little over a thousand people that make their full time living on teesspring today via brands they've launched. And the other side is influencers. So YouTube stars, reddit communities, bloggers who want to add product merchandise as a way to sort of create a brand and monetize that affinity. So those are our two biggest markets. We still do work with a lot of nonprofits and love working with them. It's still a part . speaker 1: of our business, just not the majority. Thank you. Was the founder of Kiko and then Justin tv, which pretty switand. It's now for now I combinator and it's going to talk about. speaker 2: Cool. Well, while I wait for the slide to happen, I started a bunch of startups, but I think you've heard a lot of awesome, you know kind of how did I get started stories. So I'm gonna to talk about something very specific that people always have questions with, which is Press and like how do you get it? How does it work? It's something. This is kind of like an abridged version of what we talk about at why combinator, and hopefully you guys will find it helpful. So you know, a lot of people, I think when they first get started with entrepreneurship, think about getting Press and being in the Press as something that happens magically. They think about it as like something that journalists are out there trying to find the best stories and really know, discover. It's like a meritocracy, which is like absolutely not the case. So before you think about Press, one of the things you really want na think about is who you want to reach and like, what's your actual goal, right? A lot of people, like I know when I got started, I wanted to just be in the news because I thought that's what like did as an important company. And it turns out if you don't have any goals, you're not going na achieve them, right? I mean, that's of like pretty much everything. And with Press, if you just like aimlessly want to be covered, it's not really going to do anything for your startup. So getting like in the news is nice because you can send it to your mom or and say, Hey, I have a real job. You know, look, we're in the New York Times. But if you don't have a actual goal for your like a business goal with it, it's really just like not a good use of time. So you know there's many different goals. One example is you know you might want to with social cam, which was a spinoff of justiess and tv, it was like an app that was kind of like video Instagram. And our goal was really to be known as like a video like Instagram app and like be thought of in that context when it was you know time to pitch our like Silicon Valley investors and influencers. And so we really wanted to get in like Tech Press and kind of be positioned as this new hot social lab with exec. One of my goals was a second like to get customers. So exc was like a local cleaning service. And our goal was to get people in San Francisco to use it. It wasn't like useful to get the national Press because know 99% of those people couldn't use it. So we really targeted initially a lot of know like sa chronicle and a like local San Francisco Press that would directly talk to people who could potentially use our app for twitch, which is probably the thing that you guys mostly know, it was you know twitch is a espspn for gaming or kind of like a live streaming community of gamers. And our goal was to with Press was like to reach the gaming industry because when we started now it's like 55 million uniques and like people in the gaming industry know about it. But when we started, nobody really knew that it was a place to advertise. And it wasn't like known as like a we were a very nascent small gaming community. And our goal was to get people in the gaming industry, whether they were developers or advertisers, to think about us as like an important place where influencers were. So we really targeted industry trades and game Dev blogs and places where like gamers or games bestuff like that the industry was reading. So you know what's an actual story? I think there's a bunch of different types of stories, but these are usually the ones that you see in startups. Those are like product launches. Like you just launched a new version of your app. There's fundraising for whatever reason. You know Press loves to write about fundraising even though it's not very interesting. So you if you raise a million dollar seed round, pretty much you can get that covered. Milestones or metrics like you've achieved a million dollars a week in revenue. That's the company that bought exec just announced that they achieved a million dollars a week in revenue and was covered pretty widely, like business stories, which generally happen when you're like already a successful company, someone you like to New York Times or New Yorker business magazine will want to cover like kind of the story of your startup. Usually don't have to worry about that in the beginning. What I like to call stunts, which are like, I don't know if you guys remember, but a couple years ago this yc company called wipay dropped a block of ice with money frozen in it outside of the PayPal, like a PayPal Developers Conference because they were like PayPal was like in the news for freezing, you know, like various developers accounts. And so that was like widely covered because it was just so know, kind of an interesting thing. And really it got them in the story right? They wouldn't have been talked about in the context of PayPal at all, really hiring announcements, if you're a big enough company and you hire someone, really important people who want to cover that and then contributed articles like you writing some sort of industry overview or some opinion piece in like maybe a tech blog or side like that. So those are like you know basically any of those things can be stories. One of the things that people usually don't think about is that you know you really have to think about like everything when you start a startup, you think that everything you're doing is interesting, but that's not for like other people, right? Like what you really need to think about is like objectively, if I wasn't the founder of this company, would I want na read a story about what I'm pitching? So your incremental feature release, your 2.01 feature release, might not be interesting just because you added like find your contacts in Facebook or something. You have to you really want to take a step back before you invest the time and actually trying to pitch a story and think, does anyone, will anyone actually want to read this? Because what people are journalists and bloggers are looking for is things that people actually want to read, right? The other thing is like you don't actually have to be very original. Your pressed in news doesn't have to be original, you know, like you don't it just has to be like what I like to call original enough, right? So you don't want to be the second cooler company to raise $5 million on Kickstarter, right? That's like the first guy gets like all the news, but like if you're the I think the first video game console to raise $10 million on Kickstarter, like Yeah, was that was like they raised like a million in $4 hours. That was like huge news because they were kind of like the first in that category, right? Even though other people had raised a lot of money on Kickstarter before. So just like think about your stories in the context of like where they are in the like what else has been written about and if they're like kind of novel enough and they haven't been something that was like just written about in the news. So one of the actual mechanics of getting a story, this is like pretty tactical. So if you want to get your news in, know the Press, basically there's some easy, simple steps. So it's basically getting pressed is like you can think of it like a sales funnel. So you're gonna na talk to a lot of people and not all of them are gonna to convert, right? And so you shouldn't be upset when someone like one individual person or a reporter or whatever doesn't write your story. The first thing is like you have to think of a story, right? It's going to be one of those, probably one of those things that I listed up before. The second step is like you want na get introduced to a reporter or multiple reporters who are gonna to write about your thing. It's like much, much easier, just like any sort of business development, to actually get in touch with them through someone. It's like, you know, rather than cool emailing them, the best thing to do I found is like you want to go to entrepreneurs who were just written about, like your friends who maybe started a startup and they were covered on tech crunch, get them to introduce you to that reporter who wrote about them. The reason that's good is because from the entrepreneur's perspective, like the easiest thing to do in the world is introduce you to a reporter who already wrote about them, right? They don't like need anything else from that reporter. They're actually doing that person a favor. If your story is interesting, it's not like you're asking for interest to investors or potential you know people that they would want to hire employees. And then from the reporter's perspective, they're getting intro to someone who you know they already vetted as interesting. Like they're getting intro from someone who they know they thought was interesting enough to write about. And so like by the transitive property, you're basically they're going to think you're you know probably interesting. So you get like an email that's like, Oh, you know from this guy that introduces you to the reporter and you want to get in contact with them with enough time that you can actually get them to like write a story probably a week in advance or more, because they're not gonna to like drop everything they're doing to just write about your news. So a lot of people, especially first time entrepreneurs, will come and say, like, Oh, just n I'm watching this product tomorrow. Like can you get me in this know tech crunch or something? And that's like probably not gonna to happen unless you already have a relationship. The best way to do it, so the best thing to do is like give yourself some lead time, get that intro in advance. And then so then you should like once you've set a date for your news to go out, you're going to launch your product like in two weeks you have this intro, you set up some sort of meeting and you really want na get the reporter to invest time and effort in you because they don't like there's like kind of a suncost fallacy at play. Basically, if you, the more time and they spend with you, the more likely they are to actually write something. So you, the best thing to do is get like a face to face meeting, right? Lots of people. Report bloggers actively don't want to meet you face to face, but like if not that, then get like a phone call right? And get on the phone with them. The worst thing to do is like just have an email exchange, right? Because it's very easy for them to like forget about it, ignore it. So you want na like actually try to get in contact with them, set up a meeting. Okay. So then the next step is actually pitch them. What I usually do is actually write out all my new, like this story that I would want to see published, like in bullet points. And I like we'll write out the story, my ideal story, and I'll memorize it, like the entire set of bullet points. And when I have a conversation with them, if it's in person, I'll like walk them through this. Like I'll have a conversation that's like structured, like my outline and theybe, like taking notes, right? And then theygo and transcribe those notes into a story. And so it's a like what I wrote will eventually be translated into a actual story. And by preparing, you can actually much more easily control the conversation and not forget critical things like your cofounmentioning, your cofounder's name, or like what all the features in your awesome app are. If it's I'm doing this like on the phone, I will like have this bullet points in front of me and I will make sure to walk through a conversation that includes all of those things. So you know, you do that, you have a pitch, they take notes, they're going to write the story at this time. And then the next thing is like follow up like a couple days or a day before your actual news goes out. You want to send them an email that says, like, you know this is the time we're launching the app. Like thanks for meeting. Here's like collateral. Like if you have like a video or photos or something, you want them to include screenshots, like how to spell your cofounders names and your name, just like include all the information that I really care about. And I bold it right? And then that's it. Then hopefully the day comes, you Press submit on their release to the App Store. And at the same time, they release their article on tech crunch and you are famous. Okay, so a lot of people ask us about pr firms. So you know I think in the beginning, it's kind of like everything else you do at a startup, you want to do it yourself before you hire someone else to do it. And it's actually pretty easy, especially with Tech Press, you and bloggers who like constantly need new things to write about. And you know you should I strongly encourage people to like try it themselves and kind of get started by learning the process themselves before they hire anyone. One thing I'll say is that firms can only help you with kind of the contacts and the logistics, but they can't help you know what's interesting about your company or very, you know, I've never had anyone who's been able to tell me what the stories that I'm producing are. They've only been able to tell me, you know your you know here's a list of reporters that you might want to contact. So you know you really have to be responsible for thinking about like what's interesting about your company and what are you doing? You know what's the roadmap of interesting things that you're working on? They're also really expensive. You know I think we were spending between 5000 and $20000a month, which is like for various firms. That's a lot for a startup, right? You should it's generally not a good use of money, I would say, especially in the very early days. You know, getting pressed is a lot of work, so you should really make sure it's worth it. You know, like I said, it really getting pressed doesn't mean it feels like it's like a vanity metric, right? It feels like you're being successful because lots of successful companies, you know, like Google and Facebook are covered in the Press all the time. But it doesn't actually mean you're successful. It doesn't you actually give you mean that getting you're making money, you're getting users, you're making those users happy. It's you know sometimes it's a really good strategy for getting your first hundred or 200 or 1000 customers, but it's really not a scalable user acquisition strategy. So it's something that's really just like a you know a bootstrap. You can't just get like infinity articles written about you. Like eventually people are going to get tired of hearing about your company and usually that happens pretty quickly, right? The pull point about news is it's new. And so it's pretty, pretty pretty hard unless you're Google to get covered in the Press like every week, you know something to you know if you decide it's worth it though, like you do want to have like a regular heartbeat of news. So that's like something where you know you're planning out those types of what you're thinking about what you're doing that matches those you know maybe seven story types in the future. And like you know when I was you know working primarily on marketing and pr, it would be I would like make a schedule on like a calendar if when we're gonna to launch things and like make sure to space them out but have them you know appear regular at regular intervals so that people like didn't wouldn't forget about us and we could kind of maximize our coverage. And you won't really want to keep your know contacts fresh. It's like really a relationships business. So once someone writes about you, you should keep going back to them for more for you know to write about you in the future. It's kind of like you know when when basically people know you're more likely to do something for someone you've already like done something for you you really like. It's if you just, you know I would try to establish good relationships with a couple reporters over time that you can go to to you know break news and it will come in handy later if you ever have are in the position, if you're fortunate enough to be in the position where people are writing negative things about you, having relationships will help you know kind of get your side of the story out. And the last thing is like you know it's kind of golden rule really, or maybe more like a pay it forward really applies here. Like you should help your fellow entrepreneurs get get coverage because they will help you get coverage. The best way to get covered is really through these warm introductions. And so you know when I'm ever I'm you know meeting with reporters, I always help like throwing out the names of other things that I think would be interesting stories for them. And usually that comes back. The reporters like it because it's like helping them find interesting stories and you're more likely to get leads back from those entrepreneurs that you help out. So if you're interested in learning more about Press, there's two resources that I really liked. Jason Kincaid, who's former tech crunch reporter, just wrote a really, really great overview that covers a lot of the things I just talked about in more depth. And from the blogger side, that was a really great book. And then kind of an evil resource is this book, trust me, I'm lying, which was written by one of a former marketer at American Apparel. And he talks about a lot of ways that he pretty like evilly actually manipulated the Press. But I think it's a pretty good look into the psychology of how people, things spread on the Internet. You know, how stories spread on the Internet and it might be valuable to take a look at cool. That's basically it. One question, just one. Okay. Two questions or zero questions. speaker 1: So when is the right time start werying what Press altogether better. speaker 2: When is the right time to start worrying about Press altogether? I think it's a really good way. Like if you just the first time I launched you my first products in our first startup, for a lot of them, we got like zero attention and we didn't really know how to even get 100 users. I think it's a really fine way to get 100 users. And a lot of companies in yc, when they first launched their product, will encourage them to get out and just do one tech crstory to get a few people to see it. And it's good to get in the practice. I wouldn't like obsess over getting like coverage in multiple outlets or anything like that in the very beginning. All right. Anything else there . speaker 1: seems . speaker 2: like . speaker 1: the biggest story of with the Pokemon thing. So like how much how much of a role did you guys actually play getting that out? Yeah. Or was that just . speaker 2: like so twitch you know had this thing called twitch plapokemon where developers set up like a Pokemon like Game Boy game that was controlled by chat. So know millions of people would be typing in a or b and like the character would wanaround aimlessly. And that was like a huge news story. And I think that what we did was, you know, there's a couple of parts when we set the stage by having other news stories that so when someone from the bbc would Google like twitch and be like, what is this crazy thing that everyone on reddit is talking about? They would have some context. The other thing is like we didn't come up with the idea for that was like fortuitous, but we helped give it legs by making the company available to talk to the reporters and suggesting follow up stories about like know, there were stories not just about twitch plays Pokemon because 100000 people were watching this Pokemon game, but because you know it finally, there were stories when they beat the game and there were stories when they launched twitch plays Pokemon, you know, Crystal or whatever the next Pokemon version was. And like so we kind of gave that story like a little bit more legs, but we didn't know originated it was the community really who originated it. All right. I think that's it. Thank you very much.
最新摘要 (详细摘要)
概览/核心摘要 (Executive Summary)
本次讲座由三位创始人分享了初创公司在起步、早期增长和媒体宣传方面的关键策略与经验。三位演讲者的分享共同围绕“做无法规模化的事”这一核心理念展开:Stanley Tang的分享是该理念的生动实践,Walker Williams将其系统化为理论,而Justin Kan则展示了该理念在市场推广领域的具体应用。
Stanley Tang (DoorDash) 强调了“快速启动”和“验证假设”的重要性。DoorDash的诞生源于一个为期一小时的实验:创建一个极其简陋的登陆页面 (PaloAltoDelivery.com) 来测试外卖服务的市场需求。这个实验的成功证明,在初期,验证创意远比构建完美产品重要。他分享了早期“做无法规模化的事”的经历,例如创始人亲自担任外送员、客服和市场推广,并利用Google Docs、Find My Friends等现有工具拼凑出最初的运营系统。这种亲力亲为的方式不仅能快速启动项目,还能让团队深入了解业务的每一个环节,为未来的规模化打下基础。
Walker Williams (Teespring) 系统地阐述了“做无法规模化的事”是初创公司的核心竞争优势,并将其应用于三个关键领域:寻找首批用户、将用户转变为拥护者、以及寻找产品与市场的契合点。他指出,获取首批用户没有捷径,需要创始人投入大量个人时间和精力。通过提供卓越的、个性化的体验(如亲自做客服、主动联系用户)可以将早期用户培养成品牌的“拥护者”。在产品开发上,应优先考虑速度而非代码的完美与可扩展性,目标是快速迭代以找到市场真正需要的产品。他强调,这种“不计成本”的亲力亲为应尽可能久地持续下去。
Justin Kan (Twitch/YC) 提供了一套关于如何获得媒体报道(Press)的实用战术。他指出,寻求报道前必须明确商业目标,并将获取报道视为一个类似销售的过程,而非期待记者主动发现。他详细介绍了故事的类型(如产品发布、融资、里程碑)、如何通过熟人(尤其是刚被报道过的创业者)获得“熟人引荐”,以及如何准备和主导与记者的沟通。他建议初创公司早期应亲自处理公关事务,而非雇佣昂贵的公关公司,并强调媒体报道是一种早期用户获取手段,而非可规模化的长期策略。
第一部分:Stanley Tang (DoorDash) - 如何起步 (How to Get Started)
缘起与发现问题
- 初心:Stanley Tang最初热衷于为小企业主开发技术。
- 发现痛点:在访谈帕洛阿尔托一家马卡龙店主Chloe时,他偶然发现了“配送”是小商户面临的巨大难题。店主向他展示了一本厚厚的订单簿,其中大量订单因缺乏配送员而被迫拒绝。
- 问题验证:在接下来的几周里,团队访谈了约150-200名小企业主,他们普遍认同配送是一个巨大的痛点,且市场上没有好的解决方案。
假设验证:PaloAltoDelivery.com 的诞生
- 核心假设:团队推测,以往类似尝试失败的原因可能是缺乏消费者需求。
- 实验设计:为了在没有车辆和配送基础设施的情况下测试这一假设,团队决定进行一个简单的实验。
- 他们花费约一个小时,创建了一个名为
PaloAltoDelivery.com的简易登陆页面。 - 页面内容仅包含从网上找到的帕洛阿尔托餐厅的PDF菜单和一个作为联系方式的个人手机号码。
- Stanley形容这个页面 > “超级、超级,你知道的,简单、丑陋。”
- 他们花费约一个小时,创建了一个名为
- 意外的成功:
- 网站上线后不久,他们就接到了第一个订单——一份泰式炒河粉。团队成员亲自驾车完成了这次配送。
- 第一个客户是一位学者,著有《Weed the People》一书,这次经历被Stanley称为“最好也是最坏的第一次配送”。
- 此后订单量持续增长(从1个到2个,再到5个、10个),完全依靠口碑传播,尤其是在斯坦福校园内。
- 关键领悟:当用户愿意忍受如此糟糕的设计和体验来使用你的服务时,这证明你发现了一个真实且强烈的需求。
初期运营:做无法规模化的事 (Doing Things that Don't Scale)
- 快速启动:DoorDash的启动没有依赖复杂的算法、后端系统或配送团队。Stanley强调 > “在初期,这一切都不是必需的。初期的一切都是为了测试你的想法,让项目启动起来。”
- 亲力亲为的实践:
- 创始人角色:团队成员亲自担任配送员、客服和市场人员(在大学路派发传单)。
- 拼凑的工具栈:
- 使用 Square 收款(曾因交易频繁被怀疑洗钱而遭关停,但幸运的是,联合创始人Tony曾在Square工作,通过给前同事发邮件迅速解决了问题)。
- 使用 Google Docs 追踪订单。
- 使用苹果的 Find My Friends 追踪配送员位置。
- 亲力亲为的价值:
- 成为领域专家:亲自配送帮助团队理解了配送流程的全部细节;手动调度订单为日后开发智能调度算法提供了第一手经验。
- 获取真实反馈:亲自做客服,能实时了解客户问题。团队会在每晚手动给新客户发送个性化邮件(例如,看到用户点了某家餐厅的烤鸡串,就会在邮件中提及自己也喜欢这家店),这种方式获得了宝贵的用户反馈和极高的客户满意度。
核心总结与Q&A
- 三大核心经验:
- 测试你的假设:将创业想法视为一系列实验。
- 快速启动:用一个简单的登陆页面在一小时内就完成了上线。
- 做无法规模化的事:这是初创公司早期最大的竞争优势之一,当需求得到验证后,再考虑如何规模化。
- Q&A亮点:
- 首批用户来源:几乎完全是口碑传播,验证了需求的强度。
- 为何现在能成功:移动设备的普及是关键,它使得建立一个基于手机、利用独立承包商的按需配送网络成为可能。
- 公司化进程:在2013年夏天决定加入YC时正式注册成立公司。
第二部分:Walker Williams (Teespring) - 做那些无法规模化的事 (Doing Things that Don't Scale)
“无法规模化的事”的定义与重要性
- 定义:指那些“根本上不可持续的”增长策略,它们无法为你带来第一百万个用户,通常会受限于时间等因素。
- 三大应用领域:
- 寻找首批用户。
- 将用户转变为拥护者。
- 寻找产品与市场的契合点 (Product-Market Fit)。
第一步:寻找首批用户
- 没有捷径:Walker强调用户获取没有“银弹”,创始人必须放弃寻找一劳永逸的解决方案(如完美的点击付费广告、合作协议等)的幻想。
- Teespring的早期:最初的业务模式“荒谬地不可持续”:为了卖出50件T恤,需要花费数天开会、提供免费设计、反复修改、并亲自负责产品上线和社交媒体推广。
- 创始人的责任:创始人有责任“不惜一切代价”去获取首批用户,这通常意味着投入大量的个人时间和精力,例如每天发100封邮件、打电话、利用校友网络等。
- 忠告:不建议免费提供产品。收费可以确保用户真正重视你的产品,避免产生虚假的安全感。
第二步:将用户转变为拥护者 (Champions)
- 拥护者的定义:会主动谈论并为你的产品宣传的用户。
- 核心方法:与用户交谈
- 通过提供“非同寻常的、卓越的体验”来打动用户,最简单的方式就是与他们交谈。
- Walker强调:> “我怎么强调都不过分,花大量时间与用户交谈是多么重要。”
- 个人实践:至今他仍亲自处理公司的“无人认领”邮件(每天约12-20封),并每晚阅读所有关于Teespring的推文和社区帖子。
- 与用户沟通的三种方式:
- 亲自做客服:他和联合创始人在公司月收入达到13-14万美元前,一直亲自负责所有客服工作。虽然面对用户抱怨很痛苦——Walker坦言至今打开客服后台时仍会感到“胃下沉”的“情绪反应”——但这是了解产品问题的最佳途径。
- 主动联系用户:主动接触现有用户和已流失的用户,了解他们的体验和离开的原因。
- 监控社交媒体和社区:了解人们如何谈论你的品牌,并及时介入解决问题。
- 弥补错误:> “重要的是永远把事情做对,永远多走一步。” 一个差评用户造成的负面影响,足以抵消十个拥护者的正面宣传。即使代价高昂,也要纠正错误,这往往能将被动用户转变为最忠实的拥护者。
第三步:寻找产品与市场的契合点
- 核心理念:你最初发布的产品几乎肯定不是能让你规模化的产品。因此,早期的任务是尽快迭代。
- 速度优于完美:> “你需要优化速度,而不是可扩展性和整洁的代码。”
- Teespring案例:为满足几个企业客户的特殊需求,他们没有花一个月时间去重构代码,而是直接复制了整个代码库和数据库,在3-4天内就搭建了一个独立版本。这让他们快速验证了功能,之后再将核心功能整合回主产品。
- “下一个数量级”法则:> “只需要担心下一个数量级的问题。” 当你有10个用户时,考虑如何到100个,而不是如何服务100万个。
- 拥抱崩溃:Teespring早期曾有数月,网站每晚都会崩溃,团队成员枕戈待旦随时重启服务器。虽然痛苦,但为了更快地找到产品市场契合点,这一切都是值得的。
结论
- 尽可能久地坚持:“做无法规模化的事”是初创公司最大的优势之一,应该尽可能久地坚持下去,直到它被业务的增长“强行剥夺”,而不是主动放弃。
第三部分:Justin Kan (Twitch/YC) - 如何获得媒体报道 (Press)
媒体报道的核心前提与目标
- 破除迷思:获得媒体报道不是一件“神奇地”发生的事,它不是一个精英选拔赛,而是一个需要主动经营的过程。
- 明确目标:在寻求报道前,必须想清楚你的商业目标是什么,以及你想触达的受众是谁。
- Socialcam案例:目标是让硅谷投资者和影响者知晓,因此专注于科技媒体。
- Exec案例:目标是获取旧金山的本地用户,因此专注于本地媒体。
- Twitch案例:早期目标是触达游戏行业的开发者和广告商,因此专注于行业媒体和游戏开发者博客。
什么是“故事”?
- 常见故事类型:
- 产品发布
- 融资(媒体尤其喜欢报道)
- 里程碑或数据(如周收入达到100万美元)
- 商业故事(通常发生在公司已较成功时)
- 噱头/炒作 (Stunts):例如,WePay公司在PayPal开发者大会外放置一个冻着钱的冰块,以抗议PayPal冻结开发者账户。
- 重要人事任命
- 创始人撰写的行业评论文章
- 客观性检查:在推销故事前,先进行自我审视:> “客观地讲,如果我不是这家公司的创始人,我会想读一篇关于我正在推销的东西的报道吗?”
- “足够原创”即可:你的新闻不必是石破天惊的,但需要“足够原创”。不要做第二个在Kickstarter上筹集500万美元的冰箱公司,但可以做第一个筹集1000万美元的游戏主机公司。
获得报道的具体步骤
- 销售漏斗模型:将获取报道视为一个销售过程,接触很多人,但只有一部分会转化。
- 战术步骤:
- 获取熟人引荐 (Warm Introduction):联系记者的最佳方式是通过一个他们信任的人,尤其是他们最近报道过的创业者。这对各方都有利。
- 给予充足的准备时间:至少提前一周联系记者。
- 让记者投入时间:利用“沉没成本谬误”,争取与记者进行面对面会议或至少是电话沟通,让他们投入更多时间,从而增加报道的可能性。
- 精心准备推销内容:提前写好你希望看到的理想报道的要点,并熟记于心。在沟通时,按照这个大纲来主导对话。
- 发布前跟进:在发布前一天,给记者发送一封包含所有必要材料(如照片、视频、联合创始人名字的正确拼写等)的邮件。
关于公关公司 (PR Firms)
- 先亲自动手:在雇佣他人之前,创始人应该先自己尝试,学习整个流程。
- 公关公司的局限:他们能提供联系方式和后勤支持,但无法帮你创造故事的核心内容。
- 成本高昂:每月花费在5000到20000美元之间,对早期创业公司来说通常不是明智的投资。
长期策略与忠告
- 评估价值:媒体报道通常是“虚荣指标”,并非可规模化的用户获取策略。
- 保持节奏:如果你决定投入,应规划一个有规律的新闻发布“心跳”,以保持市场的关注度。
- 建立关系:与几位关键记者建立并维持良好的关系,这在未来(尤其是面对负面新闻时)会非常有价值。
- 薪火相传 (Pay It Forward):帮助其他创业者获得报道。这不仅能建立良好的人脉,记者也会因此更看重你提供的信息源,最终使你受益。
- Q&A亮点:
- 关于“Twitch Plays Pokémon”现象,Justin解释说,虽然这个想法源于社区,但Twitch团队通过主动与记者沟通、提供背景信息和建议后续报道角度,成功地为这个故事“增加了热度”,使其传播得更广。