Startup: Lecture 14 - How to Operate (Keith Rabois)
如何打造高效运转的初创公司
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- 2025-06-07 16:06
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speaker 1: So I'm going to talk about how to operate. So I've watched some of the prior classes, and I'm going to assume that you've already sort of hired a bunch of relentlessly resourceful people, that you've built a product that at least some people love, that you probably raised some capital, and now you're trying to build a company. So you've been forging a product, and now you've got to forge a company. And I'd actually argue forging a company is much more difficult than forging a product. Basic reason is people are irrational. So you probably all know this. Either your parents, your significant other, or your brother or sister, or your teacher, somebody in your life is irrational. Building a company is basically taking all the irrational people, you know, put him in one building and then living with them twelve hours a day at least. So it's very challenging. Now there's techniques for coping with that, and some people get good at and some people don't, but that's where really what operating is about. So basically, what you're doing when you build a company is you're building an engine, and at first you have a drawing literally on a whiteboard and you're architecting it, and it looks very conceptually clean and beautiful and pretty. But when you start actually translating into practice, you actually it looks more like this, and you're holding it together with duct tape. And it takes a lot of heroic efforts of people to actually hold it together. That's why people work 80, 100 hours a week. Is that heroic efforts is actually necessary to keep this thing together, because you don't actually yet have polished metal in place. Eventually, you want to construct a high performance machine, a machine that actually almost nobody really has to worry about every hour, every minute. And know, as we reached a joke about eBay, that if Martians took over eBay, it would take like six months for the world to notice. That's what eventually what you want to get to. Or as Warren Buffett says, build a company that idiots could run, because eventually they will. So this is what you want, basically, a performance machine that idiots can run. Now, as a leader, what is your real job? What's your role? Strictly speaking, there's only one book ever written that actually explains how to do this. It's a little old. It's written in 1982 by Andy Grove. It's quite famous and quite successful. And his definition of what your job is to maximize the output of an organization, your organization that you're responsible for, CEO's, everything. And a vpu would be part of the organization and the organizations around you. So if you're a vpe, you actually are responsible for the performer to the product team too, or the marketing team, because you have influence there. So this is how you measure people, and you want to focus on the output, not the input. The old adage about measuring, not measuring motion, and confusing that with progress, you're measuring only progress. And this is going to sound like a fancy and glamorous thing to do. Maybe people get excited about managing a whole large organization and being responsible for the output. But in practice, what you're going to learn today, hopefully, is that it's more about things like ordering smoothies, teaching your receptionist how to answer the phone properly, and serving as a ten an hour task rabbit for your employees. So let's talk about that. So at first, when you start a company, everything is going to feel like a mess. And it really should. If you have too much process, too much predictability, you're probably not innovating fast enough and creatively enough. So it should feel like every day there's a new problem, and what you're doing is fundamentally triaging. So some things will look like a problem, and they're actually a cold. They're just going to go away. So somebody dy's annoyed about this or that, that may be a cold, and you shouldn't stress about it, and you certainly shouldn't allocate a lot of your time to it. And some things are going to present themselves as colds. But just like in the emergency room, if they're not diagnosed properly, they actually can become fatal. So I'm going to try to do is help give you frameworks for thinking about which things are colds in which things are potentially fatal. So one of the most important things I learned at square is actually a concept of editing. And this is, I think, the best metaphor I've ever seen in like 14 years of running this stuff, of how to think about your job. It's natural. It's a natural metaphor. So it's easy to take with you every day. And actually, it's easy to transmit to each of your employees so that they can figure out whether they're editing or writing. It's a natural construct. You generally know when someone asks you to do something, am I more writing or am I more editing? So an editor is the best metaphor for your job. And we're going to talk about the specific things you're doing in editing. The first thing an editor does, and you've probably all had this experience in school, is you submit a paper to a ta, a draft to your friend, and the first thing an editor does is they take out a red pen, or nowadays, online, and they start striking things, basically eliminating things. The most important task of an editor is to simplify, simplify, simplify. And that usually means omitting things. So that's your job, too, is to clarify and simplify for everybody on your team. The more you simplify, the better people will perform. People can not understand and keep track of a complicated set of initiatives. So you've got to distill it down to one, two or three things and use a framework that they can repeat. They can repeat without thinking about. They can repeat to their friends. They can repeat at night. Don't accept the excuse of complexity. A lot of people will tell you that, well, this is too challenging. This is too complicated. Well, Yeah, I know other people simplify, but that's not for me. This is a complicated business. They're wrong. You can change the world in 140 characters. You can build the most important companies in history in a very simple to describe concept. You can market products in less than about 50 characters. There's no reason why you can't build your company the same way. So force yourself to simplify every initiative, every product, every marketing, everything you do, and basically take out that red and start eliminating stuff. Second thing is what editors do is ask you clarifying questions. So when you present a paper to somebody, what do they usually do? They find some ambiguity somewhere and they say, well, do you really mean this? Do you mean that you have an example of this? That's what your job is. So you're in a meeting and people are going to look to you. And the real thing you do is you actually ask a lot of questions. And they can be simple, basic questions, like, should we try this seven days a week or six days? They can be fundamental questions like, where's our competitive advantage here? We try to do this actually as investors too. Some investors will ask you a billion questions about a billion things and theyhave you due diligence forever. We try to narrow down to what are the one, two or three, four things that actually matter for this company and only focus on those things. So it allows us to be more decisive and we can make decisions rapidly. It allows us not to distract you from your day job, which is actually building a company. And yet, I think we still get to the highest fidelity answer because we don't have all these exextraneous pieces of details and data. Now it's hard. It's something you have to practice. But when you good at it, every step, you eliminate and grove estimated that you can improve performance by 30 to 50%. The next thing you do is allocate resources. So in the editing construct, this is what editors do all the time. They take editors from the mieast and covering the Mideast, and they move them to Silicon Valley, because Silicon Valley is now more interesting. Or they move them to a sports section because they want to compete on the basis of sports with other journals and other publications. So that can be top down, where I take a bunch of alresources and people and say, we're now going over here. We're gonna to compete on this basis. And then next month, next quarter, next year, I'm like, well, that Middle East coverage is getting boring, a bland, we don't want to do that anymore. Let's go chase up for something else. Or can be bottom up, just like journalists mostly come up with their own stories, that people who work with you generally should be coming up with their own initiatives. So a reporter will generally, who covers Google, come up with the interesting stories that they're hearing in the ether and propose one or two to their editor for approval. But it's not like the editor saying, go cover Google. And this is the angle I want. Once in a while they do that. But that's not the day, the day the meat and potatoes of what a journalist does every day. Your goal over time is to actually use less red ink every day. So one way of measuring how well you're doing and communicating to your colleagues about what's important and what's not, what why some things are important, some things are not, is how much red ink you're pulling out every day. It's okay if you have a bad day and the red ink ks all over the place, but it's not okay if the red ink next month is more than it was last month and next quarter is more than this. So measure yourself of how much red ink you're creating. The other thing that's very important that actually isn't as intuitive to allowpeople is the job of an editors to ensure a consistent voice. So if any of you read the economist, you can tell that there's one consistent voice. You can pick up any article, any post in the economist, and it feels like it was written by the same person. Ideally, your company should feel like on your website and your pr release on your packaging, if it's a physical product, anywhere on your recruiting pages should feel like it was written by one person. It's extremely difficult to do. And at first you're going to be tempted to do that yourself, which is okay for a failure to do that him or herself initially, over time, you do not want to be doing all of the consistent voice editing by yourself. You want na train people so they can recognize the differences in voice. So if you see this website page, it looks very different in the recruiting page, you start asking questions, why is that? Is the reporting messed up? Is one of the leaders over here not really understanding the voice of the company? So you have to fix that over time. But you want to start with the objective of everything should feel exactly the same. It's quite difficult in practice. Almost every company has at least one piece of the organization that isn't exactly on the same voice at apple, which is even under Steve's regime, which was notorious for getting this right. If you ask someone who worked at apple, asked them about the internal tools, about recruiting, do they really feel like apple products? All of them will tell you no. So you never 100%, but you definitely want to get as close to that as you can. The next complicated topic is delegating. So just like the other thing I like about the metaphor of editing is writers do most of the work in the world. Editors are not actually writing most of the content in any publication. So that's actually of your company. You are not gonna to do most of the work. You shouldn't be doing most of the work. And the way you get out of doing most of the work is you actually delegate. Now the problem with delegating is that actually you're responsible for everything. So as CEO founder, there is no excuse. There's no like that's that department over there, this person over there screwed up. You're always responsible for every single thing, especially when things go wrong. So how do you both delegate but not abdicate? It's a pretty tricky challenge. And both are sins. Like if you overdelegate or and you abdicate or you micromanage, those are both sins. So I'm going to give you a couple techniques for solving this. First, this actually comes from high output management in antigrove is what's known as task relevant maturity. It's kind of a fancy phrase for basically, has this person ever done this before? It's really simple. Like how mature is this person in doing something? And the more they've done the exact same task before, the more sort of rope you're going to give them. And the less the more they're trying something new, the more you're going to actually instruct them and consistently, constantly, regularly monitor. So that's kind of a basic concept, but it's worth keeping in the back of your brain. The interesting implication, and this is pretty radical, is that any executive, any CEO, should not have one management style. Your management style actually needs to be dictated by your employee. So with one particular person, you may be very much a micmanager because they're quite low on this scale. And with another person, you may be delegating a lot because they're actually quite mature on this scale. So it's actually a good thing if you do reference checks on somebody and half the people you call, say, their micromanager, the other half say they actually give me a lot of responsibility. That's actually that's a feature, not a bug. I didn't understand that at first at all. Like I used to be befuddled when people would do reference checks on me and come back with this complicated mosaic and basically finally figured out that maybe I was actually doing my job correctly. So then, of course, taught other people that this is the way to do it. A more nuanced answer, though, that I've sort of came up with is how do you make decisions and delegating versus doing it yourself? You don't want to do it yourself too often. So what I've basically borrowed from Peter is my first two x two matrix ever in my life. But he taught me something, at least, is you basically sort your own level of conviction about a decision on a grid, extremely high, extremely low, the times when you know something's a mistake, and there's times where you wouldn't do it that way, but you have no real idea whether it's the right or wrong answer. And then there's a consequence dimention. There are things that, if you make the wrong decision, are actually catastrophic to your company and you will fail. There are things that are pretty low impact that really, at the end of the day, aren't going to make a big difference, at least initially. So what I basically believe is that where there's low consequences and you have very low confidence in your own opinion, you should absolutely delegate, delegate completely, let people make mistakes and learn on the other side, obviously, where the consequences are extremely dramatic and you have extremely high conviction at your right, you actually can't let your junior colleague like make a mistake. You're ultimately responsible for that mistake. And if it's really important, you just can't allow that to happen. Now, the best way to do that is to actually explain your thinking. The why it's easy to shortcut when you get busy explaining why of the world, but it's very important to try when, as at LinkedIn, I had a colleague who's quite, quite talented, but occasionally would get annoyed if I didn't exactly agree with his opinion on something. And so I spent a lot of time trying to persuade him while I was making a decision a certain way. And his wild card, the card he would ultimately call out if I didn't quite persuade him was, he's like, okay, you're the boss. And that meant to me like I was burning a lot of social capital every time he said that I knew I was like really creating a thin line and that ultimately that was gonna to backfire if I did that too often. So you want na track the times that you're doing that. An example of this is square as one of my favorite people in the world. And my second hifirst marketing hire had this program he wanted to run called inner square, which basically allowed people to give out square merchants to get out ten other squares to their, imagine a food truck outside, put like ten squares on the counter and people could just grab them. And Kyle had this great idea, this would be awesome marketing program. Squares would spread squares to other people. And you know, to some extent it was on brand, so it didn't have catastrophic consequences. Each of these ten squares didn't cost that much money, so financially we could afford to do it. But at that time, my ten years of experience said there's just no way this is going to work at a meaningful enough scale to move our metrics enough. And I actually would prefer we don't not do this. But Kyle was so excited about this that I decided to just let him do it. He learned that actually when you measure this thing, it's not massive. It doesn't create like massive value for the company. It did require a fair amount of operational complexity to ship all these squares to people and figure out how to get them squares, etcetera. But it allowed him to be excited about his job and to learn how to filter future ideas. So it was totally worth letting him make the quote unquote mistake. The next and most possibly most important thing you do is actually edit the team. So these are the people that you work with and nobody body's going to have a perfect team and you're certainly not going to start that way. So what I'm gonna to try to do is maximize the probability for success in editing the team. So I like this idea of barrels and ammunition. So most companies, once they get into hiring mode, as Sam pointed out, you should defer that for a while. But once you do the they just hire a lot of people. And you expect that as you add people, your throughput, your horsepower, your velocity of shipping things is going to increase. It turns out it doesn't work that way. Usually when you hire more engineers, you actually don't get that much more done. You actually sometimes get less done. You hire more designers, you definitely don't get more done. You get less done per day. We're gonna talk about why. But so the reason why is that most people, most great people even, are actually ammunition. But what you need in your company are barrels, and you can only shoot through the number of unique barrels you have. So that's how the velocity of your company improves, is by adding barrels and then you stock them with ammunition and then you can do a lot. So if you go from one barrel company, which is mostly how you start to a two barrel company, suddenly you get twice as many things done per day, per week, per quarter. If you go to three barrels, great. If you go to four barrels, awesome. Barrels are incredibly difficult to find. But when you have them, like give them lots of equity, promote them, take them to dinner every week because they're virtually irreplaceable, because they're also very culturally specific. So a barrel at one company may not be a barrel at another company, because one of the ways the definition of a barrel is they can take an idea from conception all the way through shipping and bring people with them. And that's a very culturally specific, opportunity specific skill set rather. So two questions probably are occurto you is how do you figure out who's a barrel and who's not? One is you start actually with a very small set of responsibilities. It can be fairly trivial. It can be something like, I want to reward the engineers that are in my office at 9:00 at night, every night, with a nice cold, fresh smoothie. This is actually a real example. I was frustrated. Our engineers were working really hard at square and you know, maybe 20% to 30% would stay very late into the evening. And I wanted to sort, we already had, serve them dinner, but I wanted to give them something cool to reward them. You could think about alcohol, but that's a little complicated. So smoothies were probably a little bit better than the pizza, which drains you of energy. But nobody could get smoothies in my office to show up at 9:00 sharp that were cold, that tasted good and delivered in the right place that engineers would find them. You think this is simple, but in fact, took buto get this right. So we had an intern started, I think, on a second day, I was explaining this problem, and he said, well, I'll do it. And I was like looking at him like, there's no way I've seen my office manager fail, my assistant fail, all who are actually pretty good. This isn't going to happen. And then, lo and behold, that night they show up on time, cold, delivered the right place. And my first instinct was great, not nothing about the smoothies, but okay, now I can actually give him something more important and consequential and complicated to do. And that's what you actually want to do with every single employee, every single day, is expand the scope of the responsibilities until it breaks. And it will break everybody. Like I couldn't run the world. Like everybody has like some level of complexity that they can handle. And what you want to do is keep expanding it until you see where it breaks. And that's the role that they should stay in that level of sophistication. But some people will surprise you. There will be people who you don't expect without with different backgrounds, without a lot of experience that just can handle enormously complicated tasks. And so keep testing that and pushing the envelope. The other signal to look for is once you've hired someone is with an open office, just watch who goes up to other people's desks, particularly people that they don't report to. If people start going to your desk, someone, individual employees desk, and they don't report to them, it's a sign that they believe that that person can help them. So if you see that consistently, those are your barrels. Just promote them, give them more opportunity as fast as you can. The other question everybody else about people is, when do you hire somebody above somebody and when do you sort of mentor somebody or when do you need to replace somebody? And the way to think about this is every company has its own growth rate, and every individual has their own growth rate. So some companies that are very successful, let's say LinkedIn, LinkedIn was always a very linear company. It never went like this. So for example, I joined LinkedIn 18 months after we launched, and we had only one, 5 million users, which in a social product is a very small number. And when I joined, I was the 20 seventh employee. When I left two and a half years later, we only had 57 employees. In contrast, when I joined square as the twentieth employee two and a half years later, we had like 250, 300 employees. So each company has its own velocity on this curve. And if the compis going like this, you can only keep people in the roles that their own personal learning curve is going like this. On the other hand, if the company any's growing like this, anybody who's learning curve is faster than that, you can keep giving them the same role. To do so, always track like the individual slope of an employee and the company's growth rate. Now that you have your barrels identified, so you can pick out the people that can really take an idea that you have in the back of your head, scope it out, run with it, make it happen, ship it, and it's perfect. Where do you aim these barrels? So I'm gonna to argue that you really need to spend a lot of time focusing people. This is something I've learned from Peter teal. Actually. He used to insist at PayPal that every single person could only do exactly one thing, and we all rebelled. Every single person in the company rebelled to this idea because it's so unnatural. It's so different than every other company where people want to do multiple things, especially as you get more senior, you to definitely want to do multiple things. And you're like, you feel it's like insulting to be asked to do just one thing. And Peter would enforce this pretty strictly. He basically say, I will not talk to you about anything else except this one thing I've assigned to you. I don't want to hear about how great you're doing over here. Like just shut up. Peter would run away and then focus until you conquer this one problem. And the insight behind this is that most people will solve problems that they understand how to solve. Roughly speaking, they will solve b plus problems instead of a plus problems. A plus problems are high impact problems for your company, but they're difficult. You don't wake up in the morning with a solution, so you tend to procrastinate them. So imagine you wake up in the morning, you create a list of things to do. Today. There's usually the a plus one on the top of the list, but you never get around to it. And so you solve the second and third and have over an entire company of hundreds of people. That's just cascades. So you have a company that's always solving b plus things, which does mean you grow and does mean you add value. But you never really create that breakthrough idea because no one is spending 100 of their time banging their head against the wall every day until they solve it. So I highly recommend some version of that. You can be less stringent. You can be like you can get three things to work on, but I would still track at least the concept of what would happen if you only gave everybody one thing to prioritize. Now because you can't make decisions, you don't want to be making all these decisions yourself. You have to create tools that enable people to make decisions at the same level, ideally a fidelity that you would make them yourself. So how do you create scale and leverage? First thing I'd recommend is building a dashboard. This is an old square dashboard. It actually looks pretty presentable even today. The the construct of a dashboard, first of all, should be drafted by the founder. You need to basically simplify the value proposition in the company's metrics for success on a whiteboard. You can have other people build the dashboard. I don't actually care about that, but you need to draw it out like what does business success look to us and what are the key inputs to those? And then have someone create something that is very intuitive for every single person in the company, including customer support to use. And then the key metric of whether you succeeded is what fraction of your employees use that dashboard every day. If it's actually useful, it should be close to 100%. It's not going to be probably 100%, but you want to measure that. Just like you have quality scores for all your other kpi's with users, their dashboard needs to be as intuitive as it is as your product is for users. Other things. Wait, hold on. Yeah, let's go back 1s. Another concept is transparency. And people will often, that's weird. Okay? Transparency people talk a lot about. It's kind of a goal that everybody ascribes to. But when push comes to show very few people, I actually adhere to it. So let me walk through a little bit of transparency. In different stages of transparency, metrics are the first step. So everybody in your company absolutely should have access to every single thing that's going on. Other things that I like to do are take your board decks. And as you get more formal, the board decks will get more complicated and actually review every single slide with every single employee. After the board meeting, you can strip out the compensation information if you really want to, but every other slide you should go through with the entire employee base and explain it. And if you can remember some of the feedback you got from your board, that's really cool to PaaS on. Another thing we did at square, as the company scales, everybody's not going to get invited to every meeting, but they're going to want to go to every meeting. The way you scale, that is, you create notes for every meeting and you send it to the entire company. So we created a notes at alias. For every single meeting involving more than two people, someone would write notes and send it to the entire company. So people felt like as the company added employee, they could continue to monitor and track what was interesting, what was going on, and they never felt excluded. Hopefully. The other thing is like even like details around conference rooms, every conference room at square has glass walls, because as soon as you have regular walls, people wonder what's going on. It's amazing. Like if they can see who's actually in the meeting and who's meeting with who when start, they don't worry nearly as much as what's going on behind those closed doors. Stripe, you may have seen a blog post, but I think Patrick wrote it about email transparency, about actually allowing everybody to have access to email. That's pretty far out there, but it's actually got interesting certain merits to it. I would all call the tactics that you read about here about is sort of minimal viable transparency. I actually think you could push the envelope a lot more. Steve Jobs tried this at next. He actually tried transparent compensation. I actually think, although next didn't do extremely well, that it wasn't the real reason wasn't because of the experiment around compensation transparency and that there's a lot of merit to that and know the critique of like compensation transparency is often and well, we want people to be teammates and work together and collaborate. And if you look in the sports world, though, where people are actually teammates and they do have to collaborate, all of their converensation is completely public. In fact, each of us can look up anybody's compensation in the sports world and get it exactly accurate. And somehow it seems to work. So I'm not totally bought into the idea that you need to keep compensation non transparent. The finally metrics. So you want to measure things, you want to measure outputs, not inputs. And again, you should dictate this yourself. You should draft the dashboard to tie this all together. One important concept, or what are known as pairing metrics or pairing indicators, which is if you measure one thing and only one thing, the company tends to optimize to that, and often at the expense of something else that's important. A classistic example in payments and financial services is around risk. It's really easy to give the risk team the objective and say, we want to lower our fraud rate. It sounds great until they start treating every single user in this audience as a suspect user because they want to lower their fraud rate. So they require each of you to call them up on the phone and give them more supplemental information and facts in things. And you have the lowest fraud rate in the world. You also have the worst sort of customer satisfaction score. So what you want to measure at the same time as your front rate is your false positive rate that forces the team to actually innovate. Similarly, you can give recruiters metrics around hiring. And guess what? You'll have a lot of people coming in through interviews. But if you're not tracking the quality of hires, you may be very unhappy with the quality of people you're interviewing or the people you're giving offers to. So you always want to create the opposite as an indication and measure both. And the people who are responsible for that team need to be measured on both. Finally, around metrics, one insight I've had over my career is which you you kind of want to look for the anomalies. You don't actually want to look for the expected behavior. So that a famous example was at PayPal. None of the top ten markets that the company was planning to go after included eBay. But one day, someone noticed that 54 power sellers had actually handwritten into their eBay listings, please pay me with PayPal, and brought this to the attention of the executive team. At the time, the first reaction to the executive team was, what the hl's going on? Let's kick them out of the system. That's not our focus. Fortunately, I think David Sacks came back the next day and said, I think we found our market. Let's actually build tools for these power sellers instead of forcing them to write into their listing, pay me with PayPal. Why don't we have an html button that they can just insert? Well, that started at work. And then he said, well, actually, why don't we make them insert it? Why should we make them insert it all the time? Why don't we just automatically insert it for them so they can insert it once, and then every single listing they have forever itjust automatically appear there. That became the success for PayPal. Similarly, I was at LinkedIn and I saw this Stat that made no sense to me. The ui of the site was a little bit different back then, but 25% of all clicks, maybe 30% of all clicks from the home page where people going to their own profile, and that made no sense whatsoever. I mean, it was a setting this, like you have to literally go to the right margin, find a link. And it was 25 to 30% of every single click at scale. I mean, so this is like statistically valanced stuff. And it made no sense whatsoever. Never seemed like a ui perform that way. And I kind of went around for weeks trying to figure this out. And then someone very smart, exas max lechen, said something to me and was like, he's like, it's vanity. And I'm like, aha, people were looking at themselves in the mirror. That's a pretty good answer. So because they weren't editing their profile, nobody has like something to edit every day in their profile, but they actually were just looking at themselves in the mirror every day because it made them feel good. And then you could actually test that hypothesis and say, well, if I have more content, do I look at myself in the mirror more often? Turns out you did. If you had more endorsements, did you look at yourself in the mirramor often? Turns out you did. So you actually figure it out like, well, it's actually underneath the utilitarian product that the product team thought they were building was actually a lot of emotional vanity. It didn't exactly translate it to the best possible feature. Like the PayPal example, which you couldn't easily put a button said, be more vain today. You know, on the home page, that would probably not work perfectly. So it never really like took off the way the PayPal example did, but it really clarified what users of the product really wanted, and we wouldn't have found that without looking for anomalous data. The final topic I want to talk about is details. And in my sign reading, there's a great book I really like by Bill Walsh called the score takes care of itself. And the basic point of the book is that if you get all the details right, you don't worry about how to build a billion dollar business, how to have $100 million in revenue, how to have a billion users. That's a byproduct of getting all the details of what you do every day to be excellent. So the example he talks about in the book that really resonated with me was he took over the 49 ers in 1979. They the worst team in football. I believe they were two and 14 the year before, which is really bad for those of you who don't know football. In the next ten years, he managed to transform the team into the nfll's baswon three Super Bowls. And what's the first thing he did to start going from a terrible team to the best team ever? In many ways, he actually taught the receptionist how to answer the phone properly. He wrote a three page memo about how to actually answer the phone. Now, that may sound absurd, but his point was, if the organization as a whole does everything exactly the right way, then receivers, for example, will start running their routes at seven and a half yards, not seven yards, not eight yards, and that actually will matter. And that everybody on the team executes exactly up to the same standard of performance. You will have an organization that is performing at the highest possible level. And then with enough random variation, the highest possible performance team will do the best. So the way you translate this to a company are to a lot of details that may not matter and may not seem that they matter superficially. Most people would agree about the details matter when it faces the user, but where the real debate is on things that don't face the user. So Steve Jobs, famously in the mac, insisted upon an immaculate circuit design board. You can read about this in various books. The mac, for those of you don't remember the mac, probably everybody here, but some of you may have seen it. I actually couldn't be opened. So the circuit board design couldn't be seen by any single person in the world. There was no way to open the mac except the people who worked at apple. And Steve insisted that itbe absolutely perfect and beautiful. That's the kind of detail iled obsession that this sort of philosophy of building a company requires. Examples that may be more practical for you instead of circuit boards are things like, what food do you serve people is actually matters more than you might guess. When people don't like the food you serve them, what do they do? They go gossip, they go complain to their friends, they go walk over to someone's desk. And all of a sudden at lunch, what they're complaining about is they're mostly spending time gossiping and complaining instead of brainstorming. So you don't have this serendipitous idea matching another serendithis idea that creates a Spark. Instead, they're all wandering and willowing around. So the best thing you can do is actually give people the food they want, or food that's good for them, that makes them more productive. So it may seem a lot like this glorious job you thought you have is actually more like running around being a task rabbit for people, but it's to take the things off their plate that are a distraction so they can be high performance machines. And if you take enough things away from people that distract them and give them the tools to be successful, all of a sudden your organization produces a lot more. Similarly, another example that's often got wrong is office space. So one natural instinct is when you need an office, you have an office manager or someone on your team go out and find offices and theygo on tours with agents and theycome back with photos and ideas. You need to do that yourself. The office environment that people live in and work in every day dictates your culture and how people make decisions and dictates how hard people work. There's almost no important more decision other than what company you're gonna to be than with the office environment you're actually in. And most people don't do that. And then the final thing, and then I'll take some questions, is around effort. Ultimately, I don't believe that you can build a company without a lot of effort and that you need to lead by example. So Bill Walsh, the first chapter of his book is gets asked this question of how do you know whether you're doing her job? And this is the answer he gives coaches that used to ask him that question. So if this is what you feel like every day, you're probably on the right track. And if that doesn't sound appetizing, you probably shouldn't start a company truthfully. All right. With that, I'm done with the prepared part. Let me see if anybody has questions that can try to be helpful with any questions. Yes. So you talked about making compensations transparent. How would you do that? Especially when people equate themselves to the values of how much I would do it. And probably banans, you could do it either just everybody in the company gets paid the same, or you could have like all discipline, all engineers, or you could do it by experience, like extreme. The way Steve did it actually at next was there was a high band and a low ban. And you either had a lot of experience or low experience, and that was it so low bback then, you know. Now it would probably be like $85000 kind of everybody just flatly gets paid 85000 and if your super experieverybody gets paid like 130000, and that's just it is sort of the next translated for inflation. Like instead done of food and what's your like top three details and what cool yoube amazed. Well, Yeah. So the question was, besides food, what other kind of details do people care about the laptops they use? I mean, this is now the default that everybody has. But five years ago, it was a benefit to give people high quality machines as posed to optimizing our costs and having dell machines and ugly monitors just as an example. So if you think about all these people that are relentlessly resourceful and incredibly talented in a massively competitive ecosystem competing for talent, you want na give people the best possible tools to do the best possible job. And so rigorously thinking through, how do I make people more successful? What things do they not need to be working on? They're distracting, and what things can I actually give them that make them more valuable per day and then just break that down every day and solve that stuff yourself? So when you're in a startup environment, how do you optimize for those things? Because resources are scarce. It's a good question. I actually think that you should start. First of all, you must have your own office. I don't believe ever in shared office spaces. Peter talks a little bit about this, that every startup, every good startup is a cult. And it's really hard to create a cult if you're sharing space with people, because cult means that you think you're better than everybody else in the world, and you have a special way of doing things that's different than everybody else in the world. And if you're sharing physical space with people, it's very hard to inculcate that. So I would start there. But it is a prioritization question that when you have every company else, scarce resource, just a question of magnitude, like how many zeros are you're paying attention to? Probably not $10 expenditures, but $100 and then $1000 and 10000 and a million, then 10 million starts being a rounding error. So what I would do is figure out what's most important in a high quality office that creates a good vibe that allows you to recruit people, because recruits are very savvy about this. They walk into your office and they can tell a lot about the culture instantly. I sometimes I walk in a company office and I can tell often whether I'm gonna to invest as soon as I walk in. Like I can absolutely rule things out that I just don't want to invest in as soon as I walk in. And there's times walking in the office is like, wow, this is really impressive. You can tell how people work together, how hard they're working, how distracted they are. Roll off botesequoia made a point to me about YouTube. So when I invested in YouTube at very, very beginning, it wasn't obviously going to be successful. And then rooff led this series, a investment for sequoon YouTube. And we were on a board meeting together and he said, you know, I think YouTube is really going to work. And I said, why? And he said, well, every time I go to one of my portfolio companies, half the office is watching YouTube that much. And I was like, pretty good sign. So you pick up on these little things and you can predict a lot. What do you think is the best way to gain street credit for a new manager? Oh, boy. Yeah. So the question is, how is the best way to gain street cfor a new manager? Almost all good managers in Silicon Valley are promoted because of their individual performance and cultures that are meritocratic. The percentage ges even higher. So we tried at PayPal to only promote people that were basically kicking ass at their discipline. So Peter didn't believe in general managers. In fact, I remember going for a jaground campus within my first week at PayPal and he's asking me, you know, how things going use, what kind of CEO questions. And then we got this debate about whether the company needed any managers. And he's like, Nope, no managers. We're only going to promote people. So the vp of engineering is going to be the single best engineer, the vp of desigis going to be a single best designer. The vp of products is going to be a single best product person. And they're going to learn to manage later. And the advantage of that is have you don't demoralize people because everybody knows that their boss actually is better at their job than they are. And they can learn stuff and you can learn a little bit of the management techniques later, as opposed to promoting people who are just good people, managers that don't actually have the discipline and skill. And that does demoralize people. So I think just being excellent at something and then getting excellent at getting a bunch of people to do something is the next task. But people, you just have to learn some things. You have to learn by doing. You can't learn to play the guitar by reading a book. You've actually got to try to manage a bit and you won't do it well. I have another sort of set of tactics and classes on what you actually do when you transition from a manager, individual contributor to manager. And it's hard. One of the first things people don't get right is their time allocation. So actually, I would recommend doing what I call a calendar audit, audit and tracking for a month. What do you spend your time on and how much is managing and editing, how much is writing, etcetera. And then optimize that over time. You can get a mentor, find somebody who's been a manager before that will work with you, not your boss, because your boss has a set of complicated objectives, including how much are we shipping? A mentor can just focus on you and making you more successful. Could you give some more examples of things you can do to ensure consistent voice of the company, especially where the company is growing? I would look at every piece of copy in every department. So like another area that almost never is done. So look at your recruiting website, almost never done to the same quality as your conversion funnel. I'd look at customer support, another classic area that isn't up to the same quality, and treat customer support like a product so that you actually have an engineering team and a design team over time that actually focuses on making that world class. Usually where you have different executives at a scaled company, most executives were trained differently at different companies, and they bring some of that with them. So you've got to cross train that. So if you've hired a vp of engineering from Google, it's very different than a design leader came from apple. They don't actually learn how to do anything the same way. So you're going to have to stitch that together somehow. Either one or the other is going to have to learn in the other style, or you're going to have to create your own style and really teach that to your executives. So it shows up all the time. But all all you need to do is just pick up company's products and look for things that have a different voice. And you can see it, visual voice, word choice all over the map. Sam, could you talk a little about the tactics of how you manage people, how often you meet that that might be given goals possible? We can the email so the canonical advice. And this now sounds obvious, but actually it was pretty radical in 1982 when Andy grovohis book is you should have a one on one roughly every two weeks. Some people say every week. And I don't think you want to go longer than two weeks. One week can be ideal actually in many companies. The reason why, in fact, there's another adage, which is you should only have five to seven direct reports. That actually derives from the concept of a one on one every week so that the direct reports so that you can fit enough one on one in your calendar and still get other things done. So I think one on ones per week are a good idea. The agenda should be crafted by the employee who reports to the manager, not the manager. The one on one is mostly for the benefit of the employee. So they should walk in with here's the three or four things I want na talk about. Ideally, they circulate that it can be even bullet points in advance by email, but in advance you have time to chew on it and you're not on the fly winging your responses. But that's probably the best structure. Now, if someone's really good and really talented and has been doing something for a long time with a lot of internal credibility, you might push out the one every week and relax that to one every two weeks, possibly once a month. I don't know that I would go beyond once a month, ever. When is it acceptable to compromise and hire someone who's ammunition rather than Yeah. So the question is, when do you compromise and hire more ammunition and sevbarrel? Truthfully, you're going to hire more ammunitions by by definition than you are barrels. So there's a ratio between the two. The question is the ratio. So at some point, the ratio is gonna get out of whax. So if you're the only barrel in the company, you have 50 engineers. You might as well only have ten engineers because you're not going to get any done. So you're just wasting resources. You're going to frustrate engineers because everybody's going to need your approval, your sign off, your editing. It's just going to stack and frustrate people. So it's really different disciplines. Engineering, like I actually think like roughly one to ten to 20 is probably about the right range. Like you don't need you don't need more engineers until you have more barrels. Designers a little different, but it does. It's always going to be hiring more ammunitions and a good leader, a good barrel will kind of have a feel for that. So one way to correct for this natural tendency is to increase your head count on your team, like sort of an empire building tendency. Like, Oh, so I managed 20 people and samanages ten and you manathree. So I'm more important than Sam and you're more important than you. One way to do that is you put an x here of the number of people that the output, sorry, specify how many things they've done successfully, then divide by the number of people on their team and tell them that this is going to be their grade in their performance review. Shockingly, this why doesn't start increasing on that team. It's amazing how this works and be really explicit about it. So as a capitalist, how often you intervene this portal company and what's your so how often do I meet with the question is venture capitalist, how often do I interact with my companies, meet with them? Generally, when we invest in, we do do some seed investments where we invest less money. But when we invest a fair amount of money and lead around like a series A, A Series B round, we join the board. And roughly, I meet with the founder CEO every two weeks. That's the default. Now there can be obviously there's reflection moments and things go well or wrong and that know that's on an ad hoc basis these days. Actually, surprisingly, I do a lot by text message. I even have one CEO who snapchats me all the time, which I'd actually rather not. But so the world has changed a lot. But I try in person meetings every two weeks. You need to this devno. I mean, really, it's like being a venture capitalist is more to me like being a psychologist. So if you come to my office, you'll see actually we have two chairs, kind of a raid like this with a little table in the middle, and we sit down and basically like, so tell me your problems. You know, it's like a question. It's like, so have you then and then my response is usually, well, have you thought about this? Have you talked to this person? Have you tried this, etc. And just asking a lot of questions and going back that way, but that's 90% of what I do. So as CEO, when you've got these barils, right, let's say you're a startucompany, you've got two really good engineers and you're working on this product. I've heard that you should always be yes. How you that well, it depends on where your prioritizations are. So you, Sam, talked a little bit about this in his lecture, but every company will move recruiting first, second or third somewhere in that sort of spectrum. If it's your number one priority, then about 25%, probably a pretty good allocation. Actually, I like the calendar audit for CEO's even more so than for new managers. So what I work with CEO is sometimes who aren't thriving in that role for the first time, I actually force them to show me their calendar. And before I do that, and now I'm gonna to ruin this trick because I'm gonna to tell it to you, I actually asked them to rank their priorities, write them down on a piece of paper and just specify whatever they are. Then we go pull up their calendar and see if it matches. And it never matches like never like recruiting is the one that's most often awry. So you know, let's say half the CEO's you meet with will say recruiting is an number born priority. It's almost never the biggest block of time on anybody's calendar. And so that's what you're trying to do, is match resources and inputs against priorities and a calendar audit. Unfortunately, there's no software that does this really well. It would be great. Like actually we literally pull up someone's Google Calendar and kind of manually add up the hours, which is somewhat insane. But that's that's the best way is just what are your priorities? If your priorities are raising money, you don't want to allocate 100% of your time to recruit and you want to allocate a fair amount of time to raising money for that block of time until you're successful at it. One more question. One more question. Anybody? Okay, go ahead. On the surface, some of this advice seems contradictory because you emphasized focusing on a plapasand, delegating less important things. But then you've said it's good to write like a three page script for your reception has been focused on all the details. How do you harmonize those goals? Good question. I think the way to harmonize the question is really how do you harmonize things like where details can really matter, but you only get one thing you know to do and you've got to allocate to the top one, two or three things do. How do you put those two things together? And actually, there is some tension. And even in a healthy organization, there's some tension of like why are we actually focused on writing the script as opposed to something a user may see? I think the underlying philosophy of getting the details right is pretty important to install in the very, very, very beginning of a company because people will start acting that way and making decisions that way themselves. So you won't have to actually literally do that. And if you have to do that, it actually shows that yet the foundation isn't actually that solid. So when you first start the company, it's about getting the details right, that everybody is precise. Everybody on every task is always thinking that way. And then that Scand. Then the people you bring in, it's a little self fulfilling. People who can think that way will tend to get hired. People who can't, won't get hired. Each team and each leader will tend to enforce that themselves. So CEO 's almost never doing it. So it's partially like, how do you start? And then culture is like that. I mean, the key to culture is it's a rule. It's a framework for making decisions. And if you have a culture, tures baked, people learn how to make decisions across that culture. And you're never saying anything. You never have to really do anything except just watch and promote and move people around. Cool. Well, I guess that's it. Thank you. Thanks.
最新摘要 (详细摘要)
概览/核心摘要 (Executive Summary)
本讲座由Khosla Ventures合伙人、前Square首席运营官Keith Rabois主讲,核心论点是:CEO的核心工作是像一名“编辑”,其最终目标是最大化组织的产出。他认为,打造一家公司远比打造一个产品困难,因为这涉及到管理非理性的人。Rabois提出了一个全面的运营框架,将CEO的角色比作编辑,主要职责包括:简化(削减多余项目,保持专注)、澄清(通过提问消除模糊性)、分配资源以及确保声音一致(使公司所有对外呈现都有一致的风格和口吻)。
在团队建设方面,他强调了识别和培养“枪管型”人才(能独立领导项目从构思到交付的人)的重要性,而不是仅仅堆积“弹药”(执行者)。授权是一门艺术,应基于员工的“任务相关成熟度”和决策的“后果严重性”来调整管理风格,并通过规律的一对一会议等实践来赋能员工。为了规模化决策,CEO需要创建有效的工具,如由创始人亲自设计的数据仪表盘、极高的运营透明度(分享董事会材料、会议纪要等),以及关注产出并使用“配对指标”来防止片面优化。最后,Rabois引用Bill Walsh的理念,强调对细节的极致追求是打造卓越文化的基石,并通过在公司初期就注入这种文化基因,来平衡“关注细节”与“聚焦A+问题”的矛盾。整个运营哲学要求领导者以身作则,付出巨大努力,将看似琐碎的管理任务转化为驱动公司高速增长的引擎。
CEO的核心职责:打造高效能机器
Rabois指出,创业的挑战在于从“打造产品”转向“打造公司”,后者因涉及管理人性的非理性而更为困难。CEO的根本职责源于Andy Grove的定义:“最大化你所负责组织的产出” (maximize the output of your organization)。
- 最终目标:建立一个即使由“傻瓜来运营”也能持续运转的高性能机器,正如沃伦·巴菲特所说。这意味着系统和流程需要高度优化和稳固。
- 现实工作:尽管听起来宏大,但CEO的日常运营工作充满了琐碎细节,例如“订购冰沙、教前台如何接电话,以及为员工充当每小时10美元的‘任务兔子’(TaskRabbit)”。
核心运营框架:“编辑”隐喻
Rabois认为,“编辑”是理解CEO日常工作的最佳隐喻,它直观且易于传达。CEO作为总编辑,需要履行以下职责:
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简化 (Simplify):
- 核心任务:编辑的首要工作是拿出“红笔”删减内容。CEO的职责同样是为团队
“澄清和简化”。 - 原则:简化能让团队表现更佳,因为人们难以追踪复杂的计划。必须将目标精炼为1-3件核心要务。
- 警惕复杂性借口:Rabois强调,
“你可以在140个字符内改变世界”,任何业务都可以被简化,不应接受“我们的业务很复杂”作为借口。
- 核心任务:编辑的首要工作是拿出“红笔”删减内容。CEO的职责同样是为团队
-
澄清 (Clarify):
- 通过不断提问来消除模糊性,例如“我们在这里的竞争优势是什么?”或“我们应该每周尝试六天还是七天?”。
- 这能帮助团队聚焦于真正重要的一两件事,避免在无关的细节和数据中分心。
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分配资源 (Allocate Resources):
- 自上而下:像编辑将记者从中东调往硅谷一样,CEO需要果断地将资源(人员、资金)从一个领域转移到另一个更具潜力的领域。
- 自下而上:鼓励员工像记者提出自己的报道选题一样,主动提出自己的项目和想法,由管理者审批。
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确保声音一致 (Ensure Consistent Voice):
- 目标:公司的网站、新闻稿、产品包装、招聘页面等所有对外呈现,都应感觉
“像由同一个人写的”。他以《经济学人》杂志为例,其文章风格高度统一。 - 挑战:这非常困难。即使在以细节著称的苹果公司,其内部工具也并未达到苹果产品的设计水准。CEO初期可能需要亲力亲为,但长期目标是培训团队,让他们能自行识别和统一公司的声音。
- 目标:公司的网站、新闻稿、产品包装、招聘页面等所有对外呈现,都应感觉
-
衡量标准:
- 衡量CEO编辑工作成功与否的一个标准是:
“你的目标是随着时间的推移,每天使用更少的红墨水”。这意味着团队越来越理解公司的方向和标准。
- 衡量CEO编辑工作成功与否的一个标准是:
授权的艺术:在授权与放任之间取得平衡
授权是CEO必须掌握的关键技能,因为“你对所有事情负责”,但又不可能亲力亲为。过度管理和完全放任都是“罪过”。
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任务相关成熟度 (Task-Relevant Maturity):
- 这是Andy Grove提出的概念,指员工具体执行某项任务的经验水平。
- 管理风格应因人而异:对于经验不足的员工,需要更频繁地指导和监督(微观管理);对于经验丰富的员工,则可以给予更多自主权。
- 一个优秀的管理者在不同人眼中的评价可能是矛盾的(“他是个微观管理者” vs “他给了我很大空间”),这恰恰是
“一个特性,而非一个缺陷”。
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决策矩阵:信念 vs. 后果:
Rabois提出了一个2x2决策矩阵来决定何时授权、何时介入:- 低后果 & 低信念:当决策后果不严重,且你对自己的判断没有十足把握时,应
“完全授权”,允许员工犯错和学习。 - 高后果 & 高信念:当决策可能对公司造成灾难性影响,且你坚信自己是正确的,
“你不能让你的下属犯错”。此时必须介入,但关键在于要清晰地解释“为什么”。
- 低后果 & 低信念:当决策后果不严重,且你对自己的判断没有十足把握时,应
-
核心管理实践:一对一会议 (One-on-Ones):
- 频率:应每周或每两周与直接下属进行一次一对一会议。
- 议程主导:会议议程应由员工而非管理者主导,因为会议主要是为了员工的利益。员工应提前准备好想讨论的要点。
- 目的:这是确保有效沟通、赋能员工、及时发现并解决问题的关键机制。
团队建设:寻找“枪管”而非“弹药”
增加人数不等于提升效率。关键在于区分两种人才:
- 弹药 (Ammunition):大多数人,包括优秀的人,都属于执行者。
-
枪管 (Barrels):能够将一个想法从概念阶段一直推动到最终交付,并能带领团队协同工作的人。他们是公司提升效率的关键。
“公司的效率提升,是通过增加枪管,然后为他们配备弹药。” -
如何识别“枪管”:
- 从小任务开始测试:分配一个看似琐碎但有挑战性的任务(例如,在每晚9点准时为工程师送上冰沙),观察其执行力。成功后,
“不断扩大其职责范围,直到它崩溃为止”,以此找到每个人的能力边界。 - 观察求助对象:在开放式办公环境中,注意看员工们遇到问题时,会主动走向谁的办公桌寻求帮助(尤其是那些非直接汇报关系的人)。这些人通常就是团队中的“枪管”。
- 从小任务开始测试:分配一个看似琐碎但有挑战性的任务(例如,在每晚9点准时为工程师送上冰沙),观察其执行力。成功后,
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如何提拔管理者:
- 建立威信 (Gain Street Cred):硅谷的最佳实践是提拔专业能力最强的员工作为管理者(如最好的工程师担任工程VP)。
- 先专业后管理:这种方式能确保新任管理者首先凭借其专业技能赢得团队的尊重和信服。管理技巧可以后续学习,但这避免了因提拔一个不懂业务的“好人管理者”而导致团队士气低落。
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个人与公司的成长曲线:
- 决定何时提拔、指导或替换员工的关键在于比较员工的个人学习曲线和公司的增长曲线。
- 只有当员工的成长速度等于或快于公司的发展速度时,他们才能继续胜任当前的角色。
聚焦团队:一次只做一件事
- 彼得·蒂尔 (Peter Thiel) 的原则:在PayPal,他曾坚持
“每个人一次只能做一件事”。 - 背后的逻辑:人们倾向于解决自己会做的“B+问题”,而拖延那些对公司至关重要但极具挑战性的“A+问题”。通过强制聚焦,确保公司最重要的难题得到100%的投入和解决。
规模化决策的工具
为了让整个组织能像CEO一样做出高质量决策,需要建立以下工具和系统:
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仪表盘 (Dashboard):
- 设计者:必须由创始人亲自构思和设计,以反映公司的核心价值和成功指标。
- 成功标准:
“你的员工每天使用该仪表盘的比例是多少?”如果它真正有用,使用率应接近100%。
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透明度 (Transparency):
- 信息共享:向全体员工分享所有关键指标、董事会报告(可隐去薪酬部分)以及所有会议的纪要(Square曾设立
notes@邮件组)。 - 物理环境:会议室使用玻璃墙,消除神秘感和员工的猜疑。
- 薪酬透明:Rabois认为,尽管存在争议,但薪酬透明有其价值。他以体育界为例,运动员薪酬完全公开,但团队合作依然有效。
- 信息共享:向全体员工分享所有关键指标、董事会报告(可隐去薪酬部分)以及所有会议的纪要(Square曾设立
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指标 (Metrics):
- 衡量产出而非投入:关注实际进展,而非忙碌状态。
- 配对指标 (Pairing Indicators):为防止片面优化,必须同时衡量相互制衡的两个指标。
- 风控:欺诈率 (Fraud Rate) vs. 误判率 (False Positive Rate)。
- 招聘:招聘数量 vs. 招聘质量。
- 寻找异常数据 (Look for Anomalies):重大突破往往来自于对异常数据的洞察。
- PayPal:发现有eBay卖家手动添加“请用PayPal支付”,从而找到了核心市场。
- LinkedIn:发现主页25-30%的点击是用户访问自己的个人资料,最终意识到产品背后强大的
“虚荣心” (vanity)驱动力。
细节定成败:从细节中塑造卓越
- 核心理念:引用传奇教练比尔·沃尔什(Bill Walsh)的著作《比分会自己照顾好自己》(The Score Takes Care of Itself),即如果把所有细节都做到极致,宏大的目标自然会实现。
- 案例分析:
- 比尔·沃尔什:接手战绩糟糕的49人队后,他做的第一件事是写了一份三页纸的备忘录,教前台如何正确接电话。他相信,这种对细节的追求会渗透到球队的每个角落。
- 史蒂夫·乔布斯:坚持Mac电脑内部无人能看见的电路板也必须设计得完美无瑕。
- 对创业公司的启示:
- 食物:提供高质量的食物,避免员工因抱怨而分心,促进更有价值的午餐交流。
- 办公空间:CEO必须亲自选择办公室,因为它直接塑造了公司文化。绝不应选择共享办公空间,因为
“每一个好的创业公司都是一个‘邪教’(cult)”,需要独特的环境来培养共同的信念。 - 工具:为员工提供最好的工具(如高品质的电脑),让他们能发挥最大效能。
- 平衡“A+问题”与“细节”:这两个看似矛盾的建议可以通过文化来统一。在公司成立之初,CEO就必须注入“注重细节”的文化基因,让追求卓越成为每个人的行为准则。当这种文化形成后,团队会自发地处理好细节,从而让CEO能从琐事中解放出来,专注于解决对公司生死攸关的“A+问题”。
结论
运营一家公司是一项复杂而艰巨的任务,CEO必须扮演“编辑”的角色,通过简化、聚焦和建立系统来最大化组织产出。成功的关键在于找到并赋能“枪管型”人才,通过有效的管理实践(如一对一会议)支持他们,同时在宏观战略(解决A+问题)和微观执行(关注细节)之间取得文化层面的平衡。最终,一个卓越的组织,是通过领导者以身作则的巨大努力和对每一个细节的极致追求共同铸就的。