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- 2025-05-08 | 徐高:中国经济内外部挑战的基本逻辑和前景展望
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摘要内容
概览/核心摘要 (Executive Summary)
本次汇报深入分析了美国近期推出的“对等关税”政策及其对中美经济关系和全球化的影响,并展望了中国经济的应对策略和市场前景。主讲人认为,美国“对等关税”的经济逻辑(即贸易逆差源于他国不公平贸易措施)在经济学上不成立。美国长期贸易逆差的根本原因在于其国内需求超过供给,以及美元作为全球主要储备货币带来的“过度特权”——美国通过无成本创造的美元从全球换取商品和服务,即“薅羊毛”。然而,美元的独特地位也导致了美国产业空心化和国内收入分配差距拉大、社会撕裂等弊端。由于美国难以采取放弃美元霸权或推行共同富裕等“上策”,其选择通过加征关税来“开全球化的倒车”,试图压缩贸易逆差并退回相对封闭的状态,这是一种约束下的“次优方案”,且这种逆全球化趋势具有持续性。
对于中国而言,经济面临的挑战是与美国相反的“内需不足”,核心在于居民收入占GDP比重偏低。虽然中国曾受益于美国主导的外循环,但在美国设置贸易壁垒的背景下,中国需要扩大内需(通过收入分配改革提升消费或刺激投资)来应对外部冲击,否则可能面临全球贸易碎片化。主讲人认为,中国在应对外部冲击方面拥有比美国更多的政策空间和更强的持续性,因为中国可以“凭空创造需求”,而美国难以凭空创造供给和储蓄。维持经济和市场稳定在中美博弈中具有政治重要性,去产能导致的经济萧条是不可接受的下策。
市场方面,美国加征关税后,其国内经济景气度显著下降,金融市场出现资金流出迹象,美元资产的避险属性受到质疑,美债收益率上升与美元指数下跌同时发生,预示美国国内债务可能面临“变相违约”的风险。中国方面,出口订单已显疲软,但高频数据显示仍在“抢出口”,预计二季度出口压力将显现。国内经济主要拖累项仍是房地产投资下滑,且当前金融市场存在“融资利率敏感性缺失”问题,降息对实体经济传导不畅且弊大于利。有效的国内应对政策应是普惠性化解地产信用风险或扩大财政投资并广义理解其效益。
总体判断是,中美博弈将是长期且激烈的过程,快速达成贸易协定的可能性不高。中国经济和市场在中美博弈中“不能输”、“不能怂”,只要政策得当,中国有能力应对挑战。股票、债券收益率和人民币汇率目前处于底部震荡态势,市场等待国内政策的进一步有效发力来提振内需。
US Reciprocal Tariffs: Policy Details and Stated Logic
- Policy Implementation: The "reciprocal tariff" policy was introduced on April 2nd, [不确定] and is currently in a developing phase.
- Scope: The policy is applied not only to China but also to over fifty other countries.
- Calculation Method: According to the US Trade Representative Office, the reciprocal tariff rate is calculated based on a formula: (US Trade Deficit with a country) / (US Imports from that country).
- Example (2024 data): US trade deficit with China was $295.4 billion. US imports from China were $438.9 billion. The calculated rate was $295.4 / $438.9 ≈ 67%.
- Applied Rates: While the calculation for China yielded ~67%, the implemented rate was halved to 34%. Other countries like Vietnam faced rates around 40%, and even smaller nations like Lesotho faced rates near 50%.
- Stated Goal: The US logic, as presented by the Trade Representative Office, is that trade imbalances (deficits) are caused by other countries' unfair tariff and non-tariff barriers against US goods. The reciprocal tariffs aim to balance trade. The overall objective is to reduce the total US trade deficit.
Critique of US Economic Logic
- Economic Argument: The speaker argues that the US claim that trade deficits are solely due to other countries' unfair practices is "完全不成立的" (completely unfounded).
- Real Cause (National Income Identity): Using the national income identity (GDP = Consumption + Investment + Trade Balance), the speaker explains that a trade deficit (negative trade balance) means a country's domestic output (GDP) is less than its domestic demand (Consumption + Investment).
- Equation 1: GDP = C + I + Trade Balance (NX)
- Equation 2 (Rearranged): NX = GDP - (C + I)
- This shows that a trade deficit implies domestic demand exceeds domestic supply. The US has a trade deficit because its "内需过剩" (domestic demand is excessive).
- Real Cause (Savings-Investment Identity): Using another identity (Savings = Income - Consumption, and GDP = Income), the equation can be transformed:
- Equation 3: NX = Savings - Investment
- This shows that a trade deficit implies domestic savings are less than domestic investment. The US has a trade deficit because it needs to import savings from abroad to finance its domestic investment.
- Conclusion: The US trade deficit is determined by its internal balance between savings and investment (or supply and demand), not primarily by other countries' trade protectionism. A country can have strong export competitiveness but still run a deficit if its domestic demand is very strong. The US deficit is fundamentally due to its strong domestic demand.
The Role of the US Dollar and Global Imbalance
- Historical Context:
- Bretton Woods System (Post-WWII to 1971): Established the US dollar as the central currency, pegged to gold ($35/ounce). Other currencies pegged to the dollar. US dollar expansion was limited by gold reserves. US had trade surpluses during this period.
- Jamaica System (Post-1971): After Nixon ended dollar-gold convertibility in 1971, the system became a pure fiat system. Currencies are not pegged to physical assets.
- Dollar as Reserve Currency: The US dollar remains the dominant international reserve currency (around 60% of global foreign exchange reserves).
- Seigniorage and "薅羊毛": In the fiat Jamaica system, the US can issue dollars without physical constraint. Its status as the reserve currency allows it to "大发特发美元" (massively issue dollars) and collect "铸币税" (seigniorage) from the world. This means the US can create value (dollars) at virtually no cost and exchange it for real goods and services from other countries.
- Trade Deficit as a Manifestation: The large and persistent US trade deficit is a direct consequence and manifestation of this dollar privilege. It represents the goods and services the US imports in exchange for the dollars it creates. A larger deficit means the US is "薅的羊毛是越多的" (profiting more from the world).
- Global Imbalance: This leads to a global imbalance where the US is the primary deficit country, and other countries (including China) run surpluses, largely corresponding to the US deficit. This pattern has existed since the 1980s, predating China's large surpluses.
Negative Consequences of Dollar Hegemony for the US
The speaker argues that while the dollar brings benefits, it also causes significant problems for the US:
-
Industrial Hollowing Out (产业空心化):
- Trend: US manufacturing share of GDP fell from 23% in 1970 to 10% in 2024.
- Cause: This is not primarily due to US manufacturing being uncompetitive against foreign manufacturing, but rather against the US "美元出口业" (dollar export industry). The ability to create and export dollars is so profitable ("比卖石油还挣钱") that it draws resources and talent away from manufacturing, causing a form of "荷兰病" (Dutch Disease).
- Long-term Risk: A country with a hollowed-out manufacturing base struggles to maintain global hegemony. This pattern is "自我否定的" (self-defeating) in the long run.
-
Increased Income Inequality and Social Division:
- Trend: Since the start of significant globalization (around 1990), the share of wages/salaries in US GDP has fallen, while the share of corporate profits has risen, widening the gap between capital owners/financiers and ordinary workers.
- Cause: The benefits of globalization (importing cheap goods, financial profits from dollar flows) have been concentrated among capitalists and financiers. Meanwhile, manufacturing job losses have hurt blue-collar workers, who have become "全球化的输家" (losers of globalization) within the US, despite the US being a net beneficiary country.
- Social Impact: This growing inequality fuels social and political problems, leading to events like the Occupy Wall Street movement and the rise of figures like Trump, who appeal to the discontented "输家" group.
US Potential Solutions (Upper Strategy) and Why They Are Unlikely
The speaker proposes two theoretical "上策" (upper strategies) for the US to address these issues:
-
Abandon Dollar Hegemony: Move towards a super-sovereign reserve currency (like Keynes's proposed "Bancor") managed by an international body (like the proposed "International Clearing Union"). Seigniorage would be shared globally.
- Why Unlikely: The US earns trillions in seigniorage annually and is unwilling to give up this massive benefit. It even rejected Keynes's plan after WWII.
-
Implement Common Prosperity Policies: Use large-scale inter-class transfer payments (like Universal Basic Income - UBI) to redistribute the benefits of globalization more equitably across society.
- Why Unlikely: As a capitalist country with a neoliberal ideology, the US is unlikely to adopt such large-scale redistribution policies.
Since the "上策" is politically infeasible, the speaker argues the US is pursuing a "次优方案" (suboptimal solution) under constraints.
The Real Logic Behind US Tariffs: Reversing Globalization
- Goal: The true purpose of the reciprocal tariffs is to reduce the US trade deficit with all countries, ultimately lowering the overall US deficit.
- Mechanism: By imposing tariffs, the US makes foreign goods harder to import, effectively "主动的与全球其他各个国家脱钩" (proactively decoupling from other countries) and retreating to a more closed economic state.
- Connection to Political Slogan: This aligns with the "Make America Great Again" slogan, which aims to return the US to a state of prosperity before significant globalization.
- Conclusion: The reciprocal tariff policy is not economically sound in its stated justification but serves the political goal of reversing globalization as a constrained response to the domestic problems caused by dollar hegemony and the previous model of globalization.
Outlook for US Deglobalization
- Persistence: The speaker emphasizes that the deglobalization trend reflected by the reciprocal tariffs is likely to be "持续性" (persistent), not a short-term tactic for negotiation.
- End of an Era: The previous model of globalization, characterized by US deficits enabling other countries' surpluses, is becoming unsustainable ("愈发的走不下去了").
- New Globalization: A new form of globalization will emerge, and its direction will largely depend on China's choices.
China's Economic Situation and Challenges
- Mirror Imbalance: China's economic imbalance is the opposite of the US – "内需不足" (domestic demand deficiency).
- Core Issue: The root cause of insufficient domestic demand is the low share of household income in the national income distribution, leading to low consumption share of GDP.
- Past Benefit: China benefited from the US-led "外循环" (external cycle) by exporting to the US, which helped compensate for its internal demand deficiency, leading to rapid growth after joining the WTO in 2001.
- Current Risk: As the US raises trade barriers, China's excess production capacity will flow to other markets (Europe, emerging markets), potentially causing those countries to also erect trade barriers, leading to global "碎片化" (fragmentation).
China's Policy Options
To counter external pressure and address domestic imbalances, China has policy options:
- 上策 (Upper Strategy): Implement income distribution reform (e.g., "全民国企持股计划" - universal state-owned enterprise shareholding plan) to increase the share of resident income in GDP, thereby boosting consumption and fundamentally addressing domestic demand deficiency. This is the ideal long-term solution but requires time.
- 中策 (Middle Strategy): Stimulate domestic investment to create demand and stabilize the economy. This is a necessary short-term measure to offset weakening external demand.
- 下策 (Lower Strategy): If consumption doesn't rise and investment isn't stimulated, the economy could enter a "去产能" (de-capacity) phase.
- Undesirability: This is the worst option. It doesn't lead to a quick "clearing" but a "竞争性的收缩" (competitive contraction) of both supply and effective demand (as factories close and workers lose jobs), leading to prolonged "萧条" (depression) or economic crisis, similar to 1998-2002. This is deemed politically unacceptable.
China's Advantage in the Rivalry
- Policy Space: The speaker argues China has more policy tools and greater sustainability in the trade conflict than the US.
- Demand vs. Supply: China, being demand-deficient, can "凭空创造需求" (create demand out of thin air) through policy (even inefficiently, like "挖坑填坑"). The US, being supply and savings deficient, cannot easily create supply or savings in the short term.
- US Constraints: As the US tries to reduce its trade deficit, it will face supply and savings bottlenecks, leading to higher inflation and significant adjustments in its domestic debt ("债务一定会有重大的调整").
- Conclusion: "只要中国政策对路,中美贸易战样的,中国一定能赢" (As long as China's policies are correct, in a US-China trade conflict, China will definitely win).
Policy Implementation Concerns (Investment Efficiency)
- Potential Misinterpretation: The speaker expresses concern that the policy goal of "提高投资效益" (improving investment efficiency), mentioned in the government work report, might be interpreted too narrowly as focusing solely on the "微观的投资回报率" (micro-level return on investment) of individual projects.
- Macro Context: In a period of overall domestic demand deficiency, micro-level project returns are naturally low. A narrow focus would make it hard to find projects to invest in, even if fiscal funds are available.
- Recommended Interpretation: "提高投资效益" should be interpreted more broadly to include the "广义的带动作用" (broad带动作用) or "广义的社会效益" (broad social benefits) of investment, such as stabilizing the economy, creating jobs, and strengthening China's position in the rivalry. A broader interpretation is crucial for effective investment policy now.
Current Economic Data and Market Signals
- US Economic Sentiment: The US Sentix investor confidence index showed a "断崖式的滑坡" (cliff-like drop) after the tariffs, reflecting high uncertainty and reduced investment intention. This hinders the goal of bringing manufacturing back.
- US Financial Markets (Post-April 2nd):
- Shift in Correlation: The previous positive correlation between US 10-year Treasury yields and the USD index (driven by Fed policy) has broken down. Post-April 2nd, yields rose while the USD index fell.
- Interpretation: This indicates that the dominant factor is no longer Fed policy but global capital flows. Global funds are "从美国撤出" (withdrawing from the US).
- Loss of Confidence: This suggests a significant decline in global funds' confidence in US assets as a safe haven, which the speaker attributes to concerns about US debt sustainability as the trade deficit (and thus foreign savings inflow) is compressed.
- Debt Adjustment: While US debt won't default (can print USD), it will face "变相违约" (de facto default) through significant price drops/yield spikes and rising inflation as domestic savings are insufficient to absorb the debt issuance without foreign inflow.
- China Economic Data:
- PMI: April PMI and production/business expectations slightly declined.
- Export Orders: New export orders in the manufacturing PMI saw a "降幅很大" (large drop), hitting a new low since the 2022 pandemic impact.
- Domestic Orders: Domestic orders showed "明显的扩张" (significant expansion), partially offsetting the export weakness.
- High-Frequency Data: Port container/cargo throughput and international cargo flight frequencies remain high, suggesting "抢出口" (rush to export) is occurring, likely to third countries anticipating further US restrictions.
- Outlook: Despite decent export data in early Q1, significant export weakness is expected, likely starting in Q2.
- Domestic Stability: High-frequency data for domestic activity (rail freight, blast furnace rates) look stable, indicating domestic demand is holding steady for now.
- Main Drag: Real estate investment remains the primary source of downward pressure on the domestic economy.
- China Real Estate and Financing:
- Abnormal State: The property market is in an "非常状态" (abnormal state), lacking interest rate sensitivity.
- Reason: High credit risk of developers leads to strong "虚购情绪" (hesitation to buy off-plan), as buyers prioritize delivery over mortgage rates.
- Financing Insensitivity: Since late 2024, broader social financing also shows "明显的缺失了利率敏感性" (significant lack of interest rate sensitivity). Despite low corporate bond yields, overall social financing (excluding special bonds) has not picked up, indicating a blocked transmission path from the financial market to the real economy.
- Ineffective Rate Cuts: In this context, lowering interest rates is "弊大于利" (more harm than good). It doesn't stimulate borrowing/spending in the real economy but increases financial market liquidity, risking asset bubbles. Rate cuts are only effective when the transmission path is clear and interest rates are the binding constraint on financing.
Recommended Domestic Policy Actions
Given the external pressure and domestic challenges, the speaker suggests two key policy actions for China:
- 普惠性的旧开发商 (Broad Support for Developers): Implement policies to resolve the credit risk of real estate developers across the board. This would restore confidence, reactivate the property market cycle, and significantly boost real estate investment.
- 财政更多看重广义回报率 (Fiscal Policy Focusing on Broad Returns): When deploying investment funds, especially fiscal funds, prioritize the broad social and economic benefits (stability, employment, strategic positioning) rather than narrowly focusing on the micro-level financial return of individual projects.
The speaker believes that if either of these two paths is taken effectively, the economic situation could improve significantly.
Political Imperative and US-China 博弈 (Rivalry)
- Policy Direction: Following the policy shift in September [不确定] and given the trade conflict, the speaker believes the leadership's stance on stabilizing growth is clear.
- Political Task: Maintaining economic and market stability is a "政治任务" (political task) in the context of the intense US-China rivalry. The "下策" (depression via de-capacity) is "绝对不可能" (absolutely impossible) for the leadership to accept.
- "Coward's Game": The US-China dynamic is likened to a "懦夫博弈" (Coward's Game) where both sides apply pressure, waiting to see who yields first. The US is currently engaged in "极限施压" (maximum pressure).
- US Miscalculation: The speaker argues the US (e.g., Treasury Secretary) wrongly believes China's economy cannot function without the US market. China can stimulate domestic demand if policies are correct.
- Importance of Stability: If China's economy falters (e.g., missing the 5% growth target), it would validate the US view and encourage further pressure. Therefore, China must hold the line.
- Core Strategy: "中美博弈中中国不能输,中国市场不能怂" (China cannot lose in the US-China game, China's market cannot be timid). China has the means not to lose.
Market Outlook
- Overall: Stock indices, bond yields, and the RMB exchange rate are currently in a "底部震荡" (bottoming out/sideways) phase.
- Stocks: Supported by "国家队" (state-backed funds) intervention and strong market expectations of further growth-stabilizing policies. Upside requires concrete domestic policy catalysts (effective investment or property measures).
- Bonds: Current low yields are "反常的过低的水平" (abnormally low), explained by the lack of interest rate sensitivity in financing. This is unsustainable unless the economy enters a depression (unlikely policy choice). The central bank has signaled concern about low yields and taken action. Yields are likely bottoming out.
- RMB: Post-April 2nd, the RMB is depreciating against a weakening USD, reflecting market pessimism about the impact of tariffs on China. However, China has policy space, and the US faces greater constraints. Maintaining RMB stability is achievable and a "政治任务" (political task) to counter narratives of China's weakness. The central bank has a history of intervening around 7.3, suggesting this level is a key line. RMB is unlikely to effectively break above 7.3.
Outlook on US-China Talks
- Skepticism: The speaker is skeptical about the possibility of a quick resolution or a major trade agreement soon.
- Persistent Trend: The US policy is driven by a deeper, persistent logic of deglobalization, not temporary tactics. Expect continued high trade barriers from the US.
- Need for Mutual Pain: A period of "比较激烈的博弈" (relatively intense rivalry) where both sides feel "比较大冲击" (significant impact/pain) is likely necessary. The US is unlikely to negotiate seriously until it recognizes and respects China's strength, which will be demonstrated by China's ability to maintain economic stability under pressure.
总结核心观点
美国“对等关税”是其应对美元霸权副作用(产业空心化、社会撕裂)而采取的逆全球化策略,具有长期性。中国经济面临内需不足挑战,需通过扩大内需(消费或投资)应对外部冲击。中国在博弈中拥有政策空间优势,稳定经济和市场是政治底线。市场目前处于底部震荡,等待国内政策的有效发力。中美博弈将持续,短期内难以通过谈判快速解决。